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  INTRODUCTION   
Politics has always been theater. Today, it is also business. 
The billions of dollars that flow into modern U.S. election cam-
paigns sustain a thriving ecosystem of political service providers 
who develop strategy and execute operations in virtually every 
major race. This is not news to historians who have charted the 
evolution of campaigning or to political scientists who study the 
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activities of campaign professionals.1 Leading scholars in these 
fields have described the emergence of the campaign industry as 
a singularly important development in our nation’s politics.2 Yet, 
remarkably, the campaign industry is almost entirely absent 
from election law discourse.3 
 
 1. Among the classic works in this area are ROBERT AGRANOFF, THE NEW 
STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (1972); SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT 
CAMPAIGN: INSIDE THE WORLD OF ELITE POLITICAL OPERATIVES (1980); JOE 
MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT 1968 (1969); DAN NIMMO, THE PO-
LITICAL PERSUADERS: THE TECHNIQUES OF MODERN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 
(1970); DAVID LEE ROSENBLOOM, THE ELECTION MEN: PROFESSIONAL CAM-
PAIGN MANAGERS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1973); and LARRY SABATO, THE 
RISE OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTANTS: NEW WAYS OF WINNING ELECTIONS 
(1981) [hereinafter SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS]. Notable recent contri-
butions include DENNIS W. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE: A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN POLITICAL CONSULTING (2017) [hereinafter JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY 
FOR HIRE]; and ADAM SHEINGATE, BUILDING A BUSINESS OF POLITICS: THE RISE 
OF POLITICAL CONSULTING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY (2016). 
 2. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 3 (“There 
is no more significant change in the conduct of campaigns than the consultant’s 
recent rise to prominence, if not preeminence . . . .”); SHEINGATE, supra note 1, 
at 12 (“Whether we like it or not, political consultants play a crucial part in 
democratic practice, and the rise of a modern business of politics provides a crit-
ical window into the changing character of American democracy.”); James A. 
Thurber, Understanding the Dynamics and the Transformation of American 
Government, in CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE 1, 19 (James A. 
Thurber & Candice J. Nelson eds., 4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter Thurber, Under-
standing] (“Few changes have transformed American elections more in the past 
three decades than the professionalization of campaign management and the 
evolution of new strategies and tactics.”); Jill Lepore, The Lie Factory: How Pol-
itics Became a Business, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2012, at 50, 54 (“No single de-
velopment has altered the workings of American democracy in the last century 
so much as political consulting . . . .”). 
 3. Campaign professionals have made cameos in works on campaign fi-
nance. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, Behavioral Decision Theory and Impli-
cations for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 679, 685–86 (2010). One short essay considers the value of campaign 
consultants. Ellen Zeng, Are Campaign Consultants Valuable?, 4 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 439, 450–51 (2010). But the business of politics has received no ex-
tended treatment in the legal literature. While political scientists have been 
somewhat more attentive to the topic, they continue to describe it as understud-
ied even within their own field. E.g., Matt Grossmann, Campaigning as an In-
dustry: Consulting Business Models and Intra-Party Competition, 11 BUS. & 
POL. 1, 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Grossmann, Campaigning] (asserting that 
“scholars have largely ignored campaigns as a business activity” and “know lit-
tle about how business practices might affect political campaigns”); Gregory J. 
Martin & Zachary Peskowitz, Agency Problems in Political Campaigns: Media 
Buying and Consulting, 112 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 231, 231 (2017) (“[P]olitical sci-
entists have paid relatively little attention to the firms that actually produce 
nearly all campaign advertisements, and that handle a sizable share of all cam-
paign funds raised.”). 
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As our electoral politics becomes increasingly professional-
ized and industrialized, the time has come for legal scholars, pol-
icymakers, and jurists to grapple with the campaign industry’s 
ascendancy. From a practical perspective, studying the market 
for political services and its imperfections raises questions of 
whether and how the business of politics ought to be superin-
tended. Currently, the campaign industry is subject to minimal 
public or private oversight.4 From a more theoretical perspec-
tive, taking account of the campaign industry adds a new dimen-
sion to ongoing debates about money in politics and the status of 
political parties. In short, while existing legal commentary 
rarely acknowledges them, professional campaigners are as cen-
tral to modern electoral politics as professional lobbyists and 
lawyers are to policymaking and litigation, and they ought to be 
regarded as such.5 
This Article begins the process of incorporating the cam-
paign industry into the study of election law. As an initial step, 
it situates the campaign industry in a legal narrative. The in-
dustry’s rise to prominence was not preordained. The industry 
cannot be understood solely as the handiwork of particular po-
litical entrepreneurs, or as the inevitable byproduct of techno-
logical advances and social change. Instead, the industry exists 
as it does in large part because the law unintentionally paved 
the way. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, and continu-
ing for many decades thereafter, legal reforms weakened the ca-
pacity of the major political parties to dominate campaigning as 
they had in the past.6 At the same time, the law continued to 
allow money to flow relatively freely into the political process, 
and it effectively legitimated paid political service providers as 
proper recipients of those funds.7 
Having emerged from a particular legal milieu, the cam-
paign industry has proceeded to reshape the democratic process 
 
 4. See infra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 5. Cf. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
509, 510 (1994) (making a similar point in the litigation context); Larry Sabato, 
Political Influence, the News Media and Campaign Consultants, 22 PS: POL. 
SCI. & POL. 15, 16 (1989) [hereinafter Sabato, Political Influence] (suggesting 
that campaign professionals “need to be examined just as closely as any other 
power center in American politics”); Matthew C. Stephenson & Howell E. Jack-
son, Lobbyists as Imperfect Agents, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (2010) (“Consid-
eration of the lobbyist-constituent agency problem should be a regular fixture, 
rather than an occasional afterthought, in analyses of pluralist policymaking.”). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See id. 
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in its own distinctive image. The industry’s impact has been 
transformative both for individual campaigns and for the politi-
cal system writ large. Consider first the campaign-level perspec-
tive. Candidates and other campaigners rely on the campaign 
industry to convert a particular input—namely, dollars—into 
electioneering activities that ultimately aim to produce a partic-
ular output—namely, votes. The industry can offer these politi-
cal actors valuable expertise and operational capabilities, but it 
does not always serve them well. Rather than scrupulously pro-
moting their clients’ interests, campaign professionals may seek 
to aggrandize themselves or maximize their own financial re-
turns instead. While such agency problems can arise in a host of 
contexts, particular features of campaigns and the campaign in-
dustry may make them especially prevalent and acute.8 For ex-
ample, Super PACs and similar entities, which reap a substan-
tial share of campaign dollars, allow campaign professionals to 
operate with minimal oversight, inviting self-dealing and other 
abuses.9 For campaigners and their funders, the pertinent ques-
tion is how to ensure that campaign professionals faithfully and 
effectively advance their electoral interests. 
A campaign-level vantage point, however, offers only a 
glimpse of the campaign industry’s import. A broader, system-
level perspective reveals the industry’s impact on our politics as 
a whole.10 For starters, campaign professionals affect the com-
plexion of those who seek office. In particular, they tilt the play-
ing field toward candidates who, by virtue of their fundraising 
potential and perhaps their perceived pliability, are attractive 
clients to campaign professionals.11 Second, the campaign indus-
try and its economic incentives affect the nature of electioneer-
ing.12 Among other things, professionals overemphasize capital-
intensive campaign activities that they can monetize, such as 
mass media advertisements, which offer a lucrative source of 
commissions.13 In contrast, they underemphasize activities, such 
as grassroots outreach, that may foster deeper democratic en-
gagement.14 The industry may thus contribute to the rising tide 
of political cynicism and disenchantment. Third, the campaign 
 
 8. See infra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 166–72 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra notes 216–22 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text. 
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industry’s dominance affects policy positions and priorities.15 
Willfully or not, campaign professionals may nudge candidates 
and officials toward positions that accord with the interests of 
actual or prospective non-campaign clients, including corpora-
tions, trade associations, and foreign governments and officials. 
The campaign industry’s centrality to modern elections also 
has important implications for debates about both money in pol-
itics and political parties. The fact that campaign professionals 
handle the bulk of electoral advocacy complicates the relation-
ship between money and speech.16 It means that campaign fun-
ders and even candidates themselves are often at least one step 
removed from any communicative acts. Whether funders con-
tribute to a candidate’s official campaign organization or inde-
pendently spend money on electioneering, they are rarely under-
writing their own self-expression.17 Instead, professionals often 
make the key judgments about the content, form, and timing of 
campaign advocacy.18 Among other things, this reality raises 
doubts about whether limits on independent expenditures ought 
to be more constitutionally suspect than limits on contributions, 
as the Supreme Court has long maintained. Moreover, because 
campaign professionals may spend money in ways that do not 
maximize speech production, funding restrictions do not invari-
ably limit speech, as the Supreme Court has sometimes pre-
sumed.19 Additionally, as a policy matter, attending to the cam-
paign industry offers a new perspective on public financing 
proposals and efforts to galvanize small donors. By increasing 
the money flowing into the system, such measures effectively 
subsidize the industry and magnify its associated ills.20 
As for political parties, campaign professionals contribute to 
their organizational peculiarities.21 The major parties, commen-
tators have observed, have become hollowed out.22 Their tradi-
tional grassroots organizations have withered, shifting power to 
 
 15. See infra Part II.C. 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See infra notes 271–84 and accompanying text. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See infra notes 285–302 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 303–06 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
 22. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Party’s Over: 
McCutcheon, Shadow Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 SUP. 
CT. REV. 175, 213 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over]; Jo-
seph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends that Matter for Party Pol-
itics, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32 (2014) [hereinafter Fishkin & Gerken, Two 
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elites and, in particular, to wealthy actors who deploy resources 
independent of formal party structures in an effort to shape 
party policy and identity.23 Campaign professionals offer strate-
gic guidance and services that allow these big-money elites to 
wage their battles for supremacy within and between the par-
ties.24 In other words, campaign professionals have helped to re-
configure the parties and stand as perhaps the biggest benefi-
ciaries of that reconfiguration. Attending to the campaign 
industry thus appears to bolster the case of those who urge party 
reforms that seek to restore the primacy of formal party struc-
tures and shift influence back to grassroots party activists at the 
state and local levels.25 
While efforts to stem the flow of money into the electoral 
system and to reform political parties might indirectly restrain 
the campaign industry, direct action to reform industry practices 
might also be possible. For both practical and constitutional rea-
sons, no one is likely to put the campaign industry out of busi-
ness. A variety of strategies, however, might help to curb some 
of the industry’s worst tendencies. Lawmakers might pursue 
substantive regulatory interventions, such as conflict-of-interest 
rules and rate regulations,26 or transparency measures that aim 
to root out industry abuses by bringing them to light.27 To this 
end, existing regulations on lobbyists and other professionals 
may offer useful lessons and guidance, including insight into po-
tential First Amendment constraints. Notably, a few jurisdic-
tions have recently begun to consider and adopt regulations on 
the campaign industry, indicating that reform is a real possibil-
ity.28 Beyond governmental action, reformers might look to po-
tential private solutions, such as developing professional stand-
ards and accreditation systems.29 
The discussion below elaborates on these points. Part I ex-
plains how a series of legal reforms related to political parties 
and campaign finance helped to propel the campaign industry’s 
rise. Drawing on political science studies, journalist accounts, 
and analysis of primary source material, Part I also offers an 
 
Trends]; Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeover of Our 
Hollowed-Out Political Parties, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 845, 847 (2017). 
 23. See infra notes 321–29 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra notes 336–39 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra Part IV.A. 
 27. See infra Part IV.B. 
 28. See infra notes 360–62, 387–98 and accompanying text. 
 29. See infra Part IV.C. 
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overview of key structural features of the modern campaign in-
dustry. Part II assesses the consequences of the campaign indus-
try, focusing on the industry’s effects on candidate selection, 
campaigning, and policy. Part III then explains how accounting 
for the campaign industry can complicate and enrich existing 
theoretical and policy debates surrounding money in politics and 
political parties. Finally, Part IV considers potential steps that 
public and private actors might pursue to address some of the 
industry’s negative impacts. 
I.  A PRIMER ON THE CAMPAIGN INDUSTRY   
A. ORIGINS 
This Section situates the campaign industry in its historical 
context, placing law at the center of the narrative. It draws upon 
a body of non-legal scholarship that explores the industry’s 
emergence,30 and it integrates that work into a legal literature 
that stresses how legal rules and structures shape democratic 
practice.31 According to this synthesis, the market for campaign 
services took shape over the course of the twentieth century as 
political actors adapted to regulations that directly and indi-
rectly shaped the process of campaigning. The business of poli-
tics, in other words, is an outgrowth of the law of politics. 
For much of the nineteenth century and well into the twen-
tieth, election campaigns were largely the domain of political 
parties and their operatives.32 The major parties had a national 
 
 30. Of particular significance are the recent and richly detailed works of 
political scientists Dennis Johnson and Adam Sheingate. See JOHNSON, DEMOC-
RACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1; SHEINGATE, supra note 1. 
 31. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (5th ed. 2016) (“The kind of demo-
cratic politics we have is always and inevitably itself a product of institutional 
forms and legal structures.”); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Po-
litical Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 
804, 806 (2014) (urging consideration of “the ways that legal doctrines and 
frameworks, as well as institutional structures, determine the modes through 
which political power is effectively mobilized, organized, and encouraged or dis-
couraged”). 
 32. See, e.g., JAMIE L. CARSON & JASON M. ROBERTS, AMBITION, COMPETI-
TION, AND ELECTORAL REFORM: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
ACROSS TIME 14 (2013); JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 2–6; 
ROBERT E. MUTCH, BUYING THE VOTE: A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE RE-
FORM 3–4 (2014); SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 2–3; Dennis W. Johnson, Cam-
paign Consultants, in THE CONCISE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL HISTORY 56–59 (Michael Kazin ed., 2011) [hereinafter Johnson, 
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profile, but their vitality rested primarily on bottom-up organiz-
ing at the state and especially local levels. Party insiders se-
lected the candidates who would be their standard bearers and 
then orchestrated the politicking to get them elected.33 The labor 
behind these party-directed efforts to drum up support and de-
liver votes came mainly from the party rank and file.34  
The parties commonly engendered loyalty and incentivized 
engagement through the practice of patronage: by securing vic-
tory for their party, campaigners could secure government jobs 
for themselves.35 Patronage existed at the federal level since the 
country’s early days and, beginning in the Jacksonian era, bur-
geoned into a full-fledged spoils system.36 The practice loomed 
even larger in many states and localities, especially in major cit-
ies, where the high concentration of government employment op-
portunities enabled urban political machines to thrive.37 In ex-
change for their jobs, patronage workers not only labored on the 
party’s behalf; they were also expected to help finance the party 
by paying over a fraction of their salaries.38 Beyond underwrit-
ing electioneering activities, these funds enabled parties to play 
 
Campaign Consultants]. For historical background on parties and their cam-
paign activities, see generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN 
AND TRANSFORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995); RICHARD 
FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY (2004). 
 33. See, e.g., Thurber, Understanding, supra note 2, at 9; Michael S. Kang, 
The Brave New World of Party Campaign Finance Law, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 
531, 552 (2016). 
 34. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 35. See generally CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PAT-
RONAGE (1905) (charting the rise of the spoils system in the nineteenth century 
and early efforts at civil service reform); ARI HOOGENBOOM, OUTLAWING THE 
SPOILS: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM MOVEMENT (1961); James Q. 
Wilson, The Economy of Patronage, 69 J. POL. ECON. 369 (1961). 
 36. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976) (plurality opinion); id. at 
378 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 37. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 870 (“[T]he prospect of public 
employment was the glue that held together the party apparatus, particularly 
at the local level.”). Though common, patronage and machine politics were not 
universal features of nineteenth century politics. By one estimate, party organ-
izations “characterized by bosses, patronage workers, and disciplined control of 
nominations . . . governed about 55 percent of the population” at their peak. 
Kathleen Bawn et al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands 
and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON POL. 571, 588 (2012) (cit-
ing estimates from DAVID R. MAYHEW, PLACING PARTIES IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS: ORGANIZATION, ELECTORAL SETTINGS, AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 200 (1986)). 
 38. See MUTCH, supra note 32, at 3; Cynthia Grant Bowman, “We Don’t 
Want Anybody Sent”: The Death of Patronage Hiring in Chicago, 86 NW. U. L. 
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a social welfare role and deliver aid to members in need—a fur-
ther loyalty-building mechanism.39  
This prevailing regime of party primacy imposed a certain 
order on politics, but at a high cost. Generations of reformers de-
nounced the corruption and public maladministration that ac-
companied party machines.40 In fits and starts, they achieved a 
succession of legal changes that gradually weakened the parties’ 
capacity to play their traditional electoral roles.41 Their efforts 
helped—quite unintentionally—to open the door to a new breed 
of entrepreneurial campaign service provider. 
One significant category of reform activity involved rooting 
out patronage and the spoils system. Over the span of many dec-
ades, patronage gave way to a nonpartisan, merit-based civil ser-
vice. Parties lost the ability to deliver a valuable benefit to their 
loyalists, who in turn had less incentive to do the party’s work. 
At the federal level, early legislative efforts included the Pend-
leton Act of 1883, which established the federal civil service sys-
tem, limited the electoral activities of civil servants, and 
strengthened rules that barred parties from coercing federal em-
ployees to hand over part of their salaries.42 These enactments 
had numerous limitations and were initially underenforced,43 
but Congress and the Executive bolstered them over time and 
eventually went further.44 The Hatch Act of 1939 expanded re-
strictions on the political activities of executive branch employ-
ees even beyond the classified civil service, excepting only high-
level officials.45 
 
REV. 57, 84 (1991); Jed Handelsman Shugarman, The Dependent Origins of In-
dependent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Tenure of Office 
Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL. 139, 143 (2015). 
 39. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 33, at 549. 
 40. See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS: AN AP-
PRECIATION OF PARTIES AND PARTISANSHIP 165–80 (2010) (describing the tradi-
tion of progressive anti-partyism). 
 41. CARSON & ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 25 (“With each passing election 
in the early twentieth century, parties were losing their grip over the electoral 
system they had once firmly controlled.”). 
 42. Civil Service (Pendleton) Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). 
 43. See, e.g., Louis Lawrence Boyle, Reforming Civil Service Reform: 
Should the Federal Government Continue to Regulate State and Local Govern-
ment Employees?, 7 J.L. & POL. 243, 249–50, 249 n.35 (1991); Jon D. Michaels, 
An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 542 
n.115 (2015). 
 44. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 873. 
 45. Hatch Political Activity Act, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) 
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). See generally JAMES ECCLES, THE 
HATCH ACT AND THE AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY (1981). 
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At the state and local levels, civil service reform occurred on 
disparate timelines and in varying degrees. Many jurisdictions 
established civil service systems during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.46 A 1940 amendment to the Hatch Act 
extended the prohibition on the political activities of federal em-
ployees to certain state and local employees who held federally 
funded positions.47 Yet patronage remained widespread until at 
least the 1950s.48 In a few places, such as Chicago, it lingered 
even longer.49 The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately stepped in 
and rejected patronage practices on First Amendment grounds.50 
Parties attempted to blunt the loss of their patronage networks 
in part by aligning themselves closely with organized interest 
groups,51 but their ability to reward these groups and their mem-
bers for campaign assistance was generally more attenuated. 
Moreover, some of these groups, such as labor unions, have 
themselves weakened over time.52 
At the same time that anti-patronage measures were strip-
ping parties of their traditional campaign labor force, reforms 
were also shifting power over candidate nominations from party 
bosses and elites to the broader electorate. Between 1899 and 
1915, all but three states adopted direct primary systems for se-
lecting party nominees.53 Primaries meant a new round of cam-
paign activity in which candidates sought the party’s imprima-
tur by winning over voters rather than insiders.54 Although 
 
 46. See, e.g., Frank J. Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, 20 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 28 (1960); Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional 
Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of 
Civil Service Reform, 1880–1935, 28 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 22 (1983). 
 47. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767. 
 48. See, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW 477 (5th ed. 
2012); ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZA-
TION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH 242 (2002); Bowman, supra note 38, 
at 60–61. 
 49. See Bowman, supra note 38.  
 50. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
patronage dismissals violate the First Amendment); see also O’Hare Truck 
Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Rutan v. Republican Party 
of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). 
 51. Frank J. Sorauf, Patronage and Party, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 115, 119 
(1959). 
 52. See, e.g., JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 163–64, 180–
81 (2014). 
 53. WARE, supra note 48, at 15. Political scientists disagree about the ex-
tent to which parties resisted the imposition of direct primaries. See CARSON & 
ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 22; WARE, supra note 48, at 20.  
 54. LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 48, at 415. 
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party leaders frequently sought to manage the process by throw-
ing the weight of the party machine behind their preferred can-
didates, they no longer fully controlled the outcomes.55 While it 
took several decades for the impact of this change to be fully felt, 
the primary system ushered in a new era of intraparty contesta-
tion—one in which at least some competitors had to look beyond 
the party apparatus for campaign assistance.56 
Several other Progressive Era reforms further destabilized 
the parties and reoriented electoral politics. First, just before 
moving to direct primaries, most states adopted the standard-
ized, state-printed Australian ballot.57 Previously, parties had 
printed and distributed their own ballots and saw to it that sup-
porters deposited them in the ballot box. From the perspective of 
the parties, the shift to the Australian ballot had some upsides,58 
but it also loosened their grip on electioneering.59 Second, a num-
ber of states and localities, particularly in the West, embraced 
direct democracy tools such as ballot initiatives and referenda.60 
By providing for policymaking through electoral politics, these 
jurisdictions generated new campaign activity that did not nec-
essarily track traditional party fault lines.61 Third, many locali-
ties made their elections formally nonpartisan, making it more 
difficult for parties to push their preferred candidates.62 Finally, 
 
 55. See ROSENBLUM, supra note 40, at 201. 
 56. See, e.g., V.O. KEY, POLITICS, PARTIES & PRESSURE GROUPS 422; AUS-
TIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA 
121 (1975); WARE, supra note 48, at 196. Notably, presidential nominations re-
mained largely in the hands of party insiders until the 1970s, when state-level 
primaries became more central to the process. See, e.g., WARE, supra note 48, at 
248–52; Bawn et al., supra note 37, at 572, 586; Robert Blaemire, The Evolution 
of Microtargeting, in CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 
2, at 217, 219. 
 57. WARE, supra note 48, at 31–56. 
 58. In particular, states often reserved ballot spots for the candidates of the 
established parties, which meant giving those parties formal legal recognition.  
 59. See CARSON & ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 41. 
 60. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 31, at 984. 
 61. See id. at 983 (observing that, during the Progressive Era, “direct de-
mocracy came to be seen as an antidote to the entrenched power of political 
machines and the powers of moneyed interests at the legislative level”). Alt-
hough “the initiative began as part of the populist and progressive movements 
that aimed in part to weaken the power of political parties,” parties today fre-
quently do become involved in initiative campaigns and strategically use direct 
democracy mechanisms to advance their partisan interests. Richard L. Hasen, 
Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 733 (2000). 
 62. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Why Is There No Partisan Competition in 
City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 J.L. & POL. 419, 465 (2007). 
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efforts to enfranchise women, which culminated with the Nine-
teenth Amendment’s ratification in 1920,63 resulted in huge 
numbers of new voters for campaigners to try to reach.64 
Changes in the law thus established new electoral battle-
grounds while simultaneously demobilizing traditional cam-
paign foot soldiers. This evolving political landscape called for 
new campaigners and new modes of campaigning.65 In a back-
and-forth that continues to this day, politicians searching for an 
edge connected with enterprising service providers who pur-
ported to deliver one.66 Initially, these were ad hoc interchanges. 
As political scientist Adam Sheingate describes it, early twenti-
eth century politicians—mainly presidential aspirants and other 
high-level figures—began to enlist publicity experts, press 
agents, and advertising gurus to assist their campaigns.67 For 
these progenitors of the modern campaign professional, politics 
was typically a hobby or side business. They applied their skills 
to politics as needed and then turned back to their day jobs and 
their regular clients, frequently major corporations.68 
By the mid-twentieth century, emerging entrepreneurs 
were making campaign-related work their primary occupation. 
Scholars generally credit two Californians, Clement Whitaker 
and Leone Baxter, with establishing the nation’s first dedicated 
political consulting operation in 1934.69 The firm’s name was 
Campaigns, Inc., a fitting title for this Article. Whitaker and 
Baxter developed strategies and messages, managed media re-
lations, orchestrated advertising buys, and more.70 California 
 
 63. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 64. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 31, at 27 (“[T]he electorate nearly 
doubled in size between 1910 and 1920 as a result [of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment] . . . .”). 
 65. See CARSON & ROBERTS, supra note 32, at 9 (“[E]lectoral reforms trans-
formed the electoral environment from a party-run cartel to a political market-
place.”). 
 66. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 6 (“[P]olitical con-
sultants emerged . . . because of the crumbling of the political party as a source 
of manpower and strategic advice, and because of the weakening of traditional 
party loyalties among voters.”). 
 67. SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 25–31, 50–65; see also JOHNSON, DEMOC-
RACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 11–19 (describing the emergence of campaign 
professionals in the early 20th century). 
 68. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 19; SHEINGATE, su-
pra note 1, at 102. 
 69. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 24–36; 
SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 102–33; Lepore, supra note 2, at 3 (describing Cam-
paigns, Inc. as “the first political-consulting firm in the history of the world”). 
 70. See Lepore, supra note 2, at 3–8. 
  
2018] CAMPAIGNS, INC. 163 
 
was a natural place for the campaign industry to gain a foothold. 
The state had weakened its political parties perhaps more com-
prehensively than anywhere else.71 Its direct primary process 
was particularly open, its municipal elections were nonpartisan, 
and it had embraced direct democracy.72 Indeed, Whitaker and 
Baxter’s first project together was to manage a campaign against 
a state ballot initiative, and such work remained a lucrative 
mainstay of their business.73 Demographics also mattered: Cali-
fornia was experiencing an influx of new residents who had not 
been absorbed into traditional party organizations.74 Mean-
while, the state’s large population, dispersed among multiple 
major media markets, resulted in operationally complex, high-
stakes campaigns that were capable of sustaining a class of pro-
fessional service providers.75 
While California was the campaign industry’s initial hotbed, 
several dozen specialty campaign firms operated around the 
country by the 1950s, and many more advertising and public re-
lations businesses participated in at least some campaign 
work.76 During the 1950s and 1960s, campaign professionals in-
creasingly became fixtures in presidential, Senate, and guberna-
torial races, initially supplementing the efforts of loyalists and 
hobbyists rather than displacing them.77 In 1960, for example, 
many of the central figures in John F. Kennedy’s presidential 
campaign were friends and confidants, but Kennedy also relied 
on advertising firms to produce television commercials and be-
came the first presidential candidate to work directly with a pro-
fessional pollster.78 As the industry mushroomed and matured 
 
 71. See WARE, supra note 48, at 234–36. 
 72. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 23; SHEINGATE, su-
pra note 1, at 103. 
 73. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 25, 36; SHEINGATE, 
supra note 1, at 105, 128. 
 74. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 23. 
 75. Id. at 23–24; SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 103, 128-32. 
 76. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 39 (describing a sur-
vey of 130 public relations firms involved in campaigns from 1952–57); see also 
Dennis W. Johnson, Formative Years of Political Consulting in America, 1934–
2000, 11 J. POL. MARKETING. 54, 56 (2012) [hereinafter Johnson, Formative 
Years]. 
 77. Johnson, Campaign Consultants, supra note 32, at 57. 
 78. JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 54. 
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from the 1960s forward, professionals participated in a widening 
array of campaigns and became increasingly dominant players.79 
Although party-related reforms set the stage for these de-
velopments, they cannot fully account for the campaign indus-
try’s success. Two additional catalysts were crucial. The first was 
innovation. As new technologies emerged, including radio and—
most significantly—television, political entrepreneurs developed 
and marketed ways for campaigns to use them.80 They did the 
same with new social science tools, such as public opinion poll-
ing.81 Some existing accounts treat the campaign industry’s 
emergence as a natural and inevitable consequence of these ad-
vances.82 Campaign professionals themselves widely subscribe 
to this view.83 But such determinism oversimplifies matters. 
These innovations were attractive to campaigners partly be-
cause legal reforms had devitalized traditional party organiza-
tions. With local party networks less reliably delivering votes, 
turning to mass media campaign methods made sense.84 In a dif-
ferent legal setting, newfangled ways of campaigning might have 
held less appeal. And to the extent new technologies did seem 
promising as campaign tools, the parties themselves might have 
had the capacity to harness them in-house.85 
The second essential catalyst was money. A market for cam-
paign services requires clients who can pay the bills.86 Here, the 
story turns not on what the law did, but on what it failed to do. 
While legal reforms from the late nineteenth century forward 
 
 79. See Johnson, Formative Years, supra note 76, at 56 (“During the 1960s, 
campaign management became more routine in American elections, especially 
at the presidential, gubernatorial, and U.S. Senate levels.”). 
 80. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 57–81; 
SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 141–45. 
 81. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 40–56, 147–67; 
SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 74–90. 
 82. See, e.g., Patrick Novotny, From Polis to Agora: The Marketing of Polit-
ical Consultants, 5 HARV. INT’L J. PRESS/POL. 12, 13 (2000). 
 83. Matt Grossmann, Going Pro? Political Campaign Consulting and the 
Professional Model, 8 J. POL. MARKETING 81, 91 (2009) [hereinafter Grossmann, 
Going Pro?]. 
 84. See, e.g., Julian E. Zelizer, Seeds of Cynicism: The Struggle Over Cam-
paign Finance, 1956–1974, 14 J. POL’Y HIST. 73, 75 (2002) (suggesting that “the 
declining importance of political parties[ ]  le[ft] high-cost television as the prin-
ciple medium of political communications”). 
 85. Cf. Walter De Vries, American Campaign Consulting: Trends and Con-
cerns, 22 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 21, 21 (1989) (“A major reason—if not the only 
reason—for having campaign consultants is that political parties basically 
failed to do their job in a changing technological and social environment.”). 
 86. See SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 133. 
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upended the political parties, reformers made few strides in 
stemming the flow of money into the political process. At both 
the federal and state levels, early campaign finance laws were 
notoriously weak and ineffective.87 Candidates and parties re-
mained largely unrestricted in their ability to solicit and receive 
campaign funds, creating ideal conditions for the industry’s 
growth: campaigners raised money to pay for the services pro-
fessionals were offering, which encouraged professionals to offer 
more services, which in turn spurred even more fundraising.88 
This cycle became especially pronounced as campaigners came 
to see expensive television advertising as a campaign neces-
sity.89 The campaign industry itself greased the wheels by offer-
ing professional fundraising services to help campaigners bring 
money in the door.90 
Somewhat ironically, when meaningful campaign finance 
reform finally arrived at the federal level in the early 1970s, it 
proved more helpful than harmful to the campaign industry. 
Very briefly it might have seemed otherwise. The Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)91 and the 1974 FECA Amend-
ments92 introduced an array of regulations, including limits on 
campaign expenditures. Those expenditure caps could have lim-
ited the industry’s growth potential, at least absent rampant cir-
cumvention.93 But the Supreme Court soon invalidated them in 
Buckley v. Valeo.94 
The provisions of FECA that remained on the books after 
Buckley boosted the industry in several related ways. First, 
FECA’s regulatory framework essentially codified and rein-
forced the shift away from party-centered campaigns toward 
 
 87. See, e.g., Melvin I. Urofsky, Campaign Finance Reform Before 1971, 1 
ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 30 (2008) (“[F]ederal and state laws aimed at regulating 
campaign finance all added up to nothing more than an exercise in futility.”). 
 88. See, e.g., HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELEC-
TIONS & POLITICAL REFORM 10–17 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter ALEXANDER, FI-
NANCING POLITICS 4th ed.]; SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 133. 
 89. See Urofsky, supra note 87, at 43–44. 
 90. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 166–67 (describing the work of 
direct mail fundraisers). 
 91. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 
(1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 92. Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(1974). 
 93. See Urofsky, supra note 87, at 49–50, 57 (describing the expenditure 
caps). 
 94. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
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candidate-centered ones.95 Under the law, individual-candidate 
campaign committees served as the main locus of campaign ac-
tivity.96 The onus was on office seekers to solicit contributions 
for their committees (subject to statutory caps) and then to de-
ploy those resources in an effort to win votes.97 This usually 
meant hiring paid staff and consultants.98 Meanwhile, the law 
restricted party fundraising and outlays in ways that relegated 
party organizations to a secondary role.99 Second, by channeling 
campaign activity through so many discrete entities—candidate 
committees, party committees, political action committees, and 
more—FECA created an abundance of potential clients for cam-
paign professionals.100 Third, the FECA regime required candi-
dates to document and disclose not just their fundraising, but 
their expenditures as well.101 Sheingate identifies these trans-
parency rules as “a boon to the consulting industry,” explaining 
that “[l]oose accounting practices that had greased the party sys-
tem for so long gave way to a new regime in which professional 
services like polling or media became a clean and legal way to 
spend money.”102 Finally, the very existence of a complex regu-
latory system encouraged campaigners to seek out experts who 
understood the law and could ensure compliance.103 
More recent developments in campaign finance law have 
further fueled the campaign industry’s growth. The Bipartisan 
 
 95. Raymond J. La Raja, Campaign Finance and Partisan Polarization in 
the United States Congress, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 229 (2014). 
 96. Id. at 232. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding FECA’s limits on party expenditures 
made in coordination with candidates); La Raja, supra note 95, at 232 (“FECA 
institutionalized a candidate-centered campaign finance system that left par-
ties with only a residual consultative role as service organizations.”). Party or-
ganizations regained some clout in 1990s as they raised and deployed increasing 
amounts of “soft money” that fell outside FECA’s regulations, but those funds 
did not restore the parties to their former primacy. See Zelizer, supra note 84, 
at 75. 
 100. SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 172, 178. 
 101. Id. at 168 (citing 1974 FECA Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 
1263). 
 102. Id. at 168–69. While Sheingate focuses on the federal level, state disclo-
sure laws began creating similar incentives for campaigners even before FECA. 
See, e.g., Urofsky, supra note 87, at 33 (reporting that, by 1959, forty-three 
states required at least some expenditure disclosure). 
 103. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS 4th ed., supra note 88, at 88; HER-
BERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL 
REFORM 35 (1976).  
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Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)104 sought to close loop-
holes in the FECA regime, but in the process it served to redirect 
money and campaign activity in ways that aggrandize campaign 
professionals. Among other things, BCRA stemmed the flow of 
unregulated “soft money” contributions to political parties,105 
prompting major donors to turn to new, professionally created 
and controlled campaign entities that are independent (at least 
nominally) from party and candidate committees.106 This trend 
accelerated after the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,107 which lifted re-
strictions on corporate electioneering, and the D.C. Circuit’s de-
cision in SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission,108 
which gave the green light to Super PACs—organizations that 
can raise and spend unlimited amounts on electioneering as long 
as they do not improperly coordinate with candidates or par-
ties.109 In short, existing campaign finance law boosts the cam-
paign industry not only by allowing large sums of money to enter 
the system, but also by encouraging funds to be routed to and 
deployed by campaign professionals. 
Two addenda to this story of the campaign industry’s rise 
deserve mention. First, the causal relationships at play are com-
plicated and run in multiple directions. While legal and institu-
tional developments spurred campaign professionalization, pro-
fessionalization also contributed to legal and institutional 
change. The campaign industry helped to fill gaps that emerged 
as traditional party organizations weakened, but the industry’s 
 
 104. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 
Stat. 81. 
 105. See ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 31, at 484–85. 
 106. See, e.g., Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 265 (2006) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in the judgment) (observing that, in response to regulations on party 
financing, “new entities such as political action committees” have “[e]nter[ed] to 
fill the void”); Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 869 (“[T]he combined effects of re-
cent reforms have been to hamper the ability of parties to raise money and to 
push hard dollars to the candidates independently, or to direct major funding of 
politics outside the regulated domain altogether.”); Pildes, supra note 31, at 
835–36 (explaining that soft-money regulation served “to diminish the already-
weakened political parties as a force in elections and to create incentives for this 
party ‘soft money’ to flow to independent groups”). 
 107. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 108. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 109. See, e.g., Eliza Newlin Carney, Democracy Has Become a Cash Cow, CQ 
WKLY. 14, 14 (2015) (“In the recent midterms, which cost $3.7 billion, $275 mil-
lion of it was spent by outside groups whose activities are partly or completely 
undisclosed.”). 
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growth then contributed to the further weakening of those or-
ganizations.110 Politicians, for instance, may have become less 
resistant to civil service reform over time in part because profes-
sionals increasingly supplied campaign services independent of 
patronage networks.111 
Second, taken together, the factors discussed here help to 
explain the campaign industry’s particular prominence in the 
United States.112 Compared to the United States, most other es-
tablished democracies have an electoral politics in which politi-
cal parties exert greater control over candidate selection and 
voter canvassing, diminishing the demand for outside service 
providers.113 Many also have campaign finance rules and other 
structural features that make campaigns less capital inten-
sive.114 On top of that, the vast scale of U.S. democracy creates 
unmatched market opportunities for professionals to tap, as the 
next Section elaborates.115 
B. STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 
Campaign professionals pervade modern U.S. electoral pol-
itics.116 Although precise estimates vary, it is safe to say that the 
campaign industry employs many thousands of people117 and 
 
 110. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 33, at 552–53 (describing the interrelated 
nature of media-driven candidate-centered campaigns and the changing role of 
political parties). 
 111. See Richard L. Hasen, Patronage, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION 1885–86 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 
2000). 
 112. Cf. Grossmann, Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 82 (“[T]he United States 
is considered the home of the world’s most professionalized campaigns . . . .”). 
 113. See David M. Farrell, Political Consultancy Overseas: The Internation-
alization of Campaign Consultancy, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 171, 174 (1998) 
(observing that party dominance diminishes the needs for campaign consult-
ants). 
 114. See id. 
 115. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 1. 
 116. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 141 (“[I]n the 2014 campaign, 
more than 75 percent of House candidates spent at least $100,000 on media, 
polls, and direct mail; among incumbents running for re-election, more than 90 
percent of candidates spent $100,000 or more on the services of professional 
consultants.”); Grossmann, Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 83; Brendan Nyhan & 
Jacob M. Montgomery, Connecting the Candidates: Consultant Networks and 
the Diffusion of Campaign Strategy in American Congressional Elections, 59 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 292, 293 (2015). 
 117. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 155 (citing an estimate from 1989 
that “12,000 people earned part or most of their living from campaign consult-
ing”); De Vries, supra note 85, at 21 (“An estimated 12,000 people in America 
earn part or most of their living on political campaign consulting.”); Johnson, 
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generates billions of dollars of annual revenue.118 Business op-
portunities are especially abundant in major contests, where the 
perceived stakes are high enough to generate large sums of cam-
paign cash. Presidential races are uniquely lucrative, followed 
by statewide gubernatorial and U.S. Senate races.119 Elections 
for the House of Representatives, for statewide offices below the 
governor, and for leadership positions in major cities also attract 
enough money for credible candidates to wage highly profession-
alized campaigns.120 This Article focuses primarily on the busi-
ness of politics as practiced in these upper echelons of the demo-
cratic system—an emphasis consistent with most academic and 
journalistic accounts.121 At these levels, professional involve-
ment is at its peak, and the market for electoral services is na-
tional in scope. In smaller scale races, campaigners do routinely 
obtain professional assistance, but they generally receive a more 
limited set of services and rely on locally oriented practition-
ers.122 
This Section offers a descriptive primer on the campaign in-
dustry. It considers how campaign professionals interface with 
clients, organize their operations, and earn their livelihoods. 
Like agents in other contexts, campaign professionals can offer 
campaigners vital expertise and enable them to harness econo-
mies of scale.123 Yet, at the same time, they can also shirk, self-
 
Campaign Consultants, supra note 32, at 57 (estimating that, as of 2008, “ap-
proximately 3,000 consulting firms specialized in political campaigns”). 
 118. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 2 (offering an estimate of $8.9 
billion in earnings during the 2012 election cycle). 
 119. See, e.g., Johnson, Campaign Consultants, supra note 32, at 56 (describ-
ing the average amount of money spent in different types of elections). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Cf. Sean A. Cain, An Elite Theory of Political Consulting and Its Impli-
cations for U.S. House Election Competition, 33 POL. BEHAV. 375, 380 (2011) 
(identifying a “top tier in the industry” consisting of a few dozen leading service 
providers). 
 122. See SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 184. 
 123. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 2; Grossmann, 
Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 89; Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 3, at 232; Nina 
Walton & Nicholas Weller, Moral Hazard in Campaigns: Do Political Candi-
dates Keep Hiring Their Consultants? 2 (Nov. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443449. Empirically, it is nearly impossible to isolate 
and quantify the value of professionals to their clients. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Rayner, What About Winning? Looking into the Blind Spot of the Theory of Cam-
paign Professionalization, 13 J. POL. MARKETING 334, 335 (2014); Zeng, supra 
note 3, at 450–51. Some political science work indicates that campaign profes-
sionals can outperform amateurs at particular campaign-related tasks. See, e.g., 
Ryan D. Enos & Eitan D. Hersh, Party Activists as Campaign Advertisers: The 
Ground Campaign as a Principal-Agent Problem, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 252, 
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deal, and otherwise disserve or exploit their clients.124 Distinc-
tive structural attributes of campaigns and the campaign indus-
try shape the absolute and relative magnitude of the potential 
benefits the industry generates and the agency problems it 
spawns. By highlighting some of these dynamics, this Section 
lays the groundwork for the remainder of the Article. 
Candidates and other campaigners—including party com-
mittees and outside groups such as Super PACs—hire profes-
sionals in a variety of capacities to perform an array of tasks. 
Some professionals take on roles as in-house staff, serving as 
campaign managers, field directors, fundraising specialists, and 
so on.125 Campaigners, however, typically outsource many core 
functions—media production, ad buying, polling, direct mail, 
data analytics, legal compliance, and much more—to a panoply 
of independent consultants and vendors.126 Campaign organiza-
tions, in other words, face a “make or buy” decision of the sort 
Ronald Coase described in his classic account of a business firm’s 
choice between carrying out activities internally or through mar-
ket transactions,127 and they generally do more buying than 
making. This tendency follows at least in part from the limited 
duration of electoral contests, which can make it impractical and 
uneconomical to build in-house capacity.128  
 
252–53 (2015); Paul S. Herrnson, Campaign Professionalism and Fundraising 
in Congressional Elections, 54 J. POL. 859 (1992); Christopher B. Mann & Casey 
A. Klofstad, The Role of Call Quality in Voter Mobilization: Implications for 
Electoral Outcomes and Experimental Design, 37 POL. BEHAV. 135 (2015). And 
a few studies claim to find qualified support for the broader proposition that 
“political consultants are effective in helping their clients garner votes.” Ste-
phen K. Medvic, The Effectiveness of the Political Consultant as a Campaign 
Resource, 31 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 150, 153 (1998) [hereinafter Medvic, The Ef-
fectiveness]. 
 124. See, e.g., Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 3, at 231–32 (discussing the 
sometimes divergent incentives of candidates and campaign professionals). 
 125. See PAUL S. HERRNSON, CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: CAMPAIGNING AT 
HOME AND IN WASHINGTON 73–76 (7th ed. 2016). 
 126. See, e.g., JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 6; see also 
Israel Waismel-Manor, Spinning Forward: Professionalization Among Cam-
paign Consultants, 10 J. POL. MARKETING 350, 353 (2011) (tallying thirty-four 
specializations among campaign professionals). 
 127. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–96 (1937); 
see also Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 851 (describing political parties as facing 
a “make or buy” decision). 
 128. Cf. Walton & Weller, supra note 123, at 2 (“By virtue of their temporary 
nature and the real risks associated with a strategy of trial and error, it is dif-
ficult for campaigns to build up real expertise in-house in a timely manner.”). 
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As avid outsourcers, campaigners end up relying heavily on 
individuals and firms who do not work exclusively for them. Con-
sultants and vendors frequently assist multiple campaign clients 
simultaneously.129 In doing so, they generally associate with a 
single party and its candidates.130 Professionals sometimes fur-
ther specialize in serving clients aligned with a particular ideo-
logical contingent of Democrats or Republicans.131 Such special-
ization can help professionals build trust with clients and 
minimize potential conflicts of interest among them.132 It does 
not, however, eliminate the challenge of balancing individual cli-
ents’ competing needs and demands, especially during the fren-
zied sprint to election day.133 Beyond working for domestic cam-
paign clients, some professionals boost their earnings by 
consulting on foreign election campaigns,134 and many also take 
on non-campaign clients.135 
The extent to which modern campaign professionals have 
diversified their client bases and expanded their operations is 
striking. Although campaign work is more lucrative than ever, 
professionals have increasingly looked beyond electoral politics 
in an effort to grow and smooth their revenue flows. For exam-
ple, professionals today routinely assist corporations and indus-
try groups with public relations and lobbying efforts.136 This phe-
nomenon, which has burgeoned over the past two decades, 
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marks something of a reversal from what occurred as the cam-
paign industry took shape.137 In the industry’s early days, corpo-
rate marketing and advertising professionals reached into the 
world of politics and applied their expertise to campaigns.138 As 
the market for campaign services matured, professionals who 
specialized in elections became the dominant players.139 Now, 
those campaign professionals are reaching back to the corporate 
world, marketing their analytic tools, crisis management capa-
bilities, and political connections.140 At least on the margins, le-
gal reform in the realm of lobbying may have contributed to this 
trend. As Congress has tightened regulations on traditional lob-
bying activities, businesses and other organized interests may 
increasingly see campaign-style tactics as an alternative strat-
egy for achieving their policy objectives.141 
With the business of politics becoming more intertwined 
with the business of business, it is perhaps unsurprising that at 
least two prominent trends from the corporate world have 
reached the campaign industry and are now reconfiguring it. 
First, technology-oriented entrepreneurialism and Silicon Valley 
startup culture have begun to permeate at least some parts of 
the industry.142 New market opportunities are materializing as 
savvy experts work to help campaigners harness emerging tech-
nologies.143 Over the past decade, demand has soared for digital 
media services and for big-data collection and analysis.144 Re-
 
INTEGRITY (Dec. 21, 2006), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2006/12/21/6633/ 
rise-revolving-door-consultants. 
 137. See, e.g., DOUGLAS A. LATHROP, THE CAMPAIGN CONTINUES: HOW PO-
LITICAL CONSULTANTS AND CAMPAIGN TACTICS AFFECT PUBLIC POLICY 120–23 
(2003); Novotny, supra note 82, at 17–18. Novotny traces this development in 
part to the success of the health insurance industry’s efforts to defeat President 
Clinton’s health care reform efforts in 1994. Id. at 22. 
 138. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text; see also Novotny, supra 
note 82, at 13–14. 
 139. See Novotny, supra note 82, at 14. 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 23. 
 141. See id. at 17. 
 142. See, e.g., Michael J. Coren, Silicon Valley Is Flipping Elections in its 
Spare Time, QUARTZ (Dec. 13, 2017), https://qz.com/1153271/silicon-valley-is 
-flipping-elections-in-its-spare-time. 
 143. See, e.g., id. 
 144. For in-depth discussion of digital-era campaigning, see, for example, 
EITAN D. HERSH, HACKING THE ELECTORATE: HOW CAMPAIGNS PERCEIVE VOT-
ERS (2015); DANIEL KREISS, PROTOTYPE POLITICS: TECHNOLOGY-INTENSIVE 
CAMPAIGNING AND THE DATA OF DEMOCRACY (2016); RASMUS KLEIS NIELSEN, 
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cently, investors have even begun using venture capital tech-
niques to launch new enterprises that focus on campaign tech-
nology.145 
Second, even as campaign-related start-ups proliferate, the 
industry also has experienced consolidation and conglomeration. 
While thousands of firms offer campaign services, Sheingate es-
timates that in 2012 just a few dozen, each “averaging around 
$50 million in expenditures, handled 75 percent of all consulting 
services in federal campaigns.”146 Large campaign firms fre-
quently absorb smaller ones, and large firms have themselves 
been bought up by even bigger global communications enter-
prises.147 For instance, the political media firm GMMB, which 
was the largest vendor for the presidential campaigns of both 
Hillary Clinton in 2016 and President Obama in 2012, is a sub-
sidiary of FleishmanHillard, one of the world’s largest public re-
lations firms.148 FleishmanHillard itself is owned by advertising 
conglomerate Omnicom Media Group.149 
At the individual level, professionals routinely migrate be-
tween in-house staff positions and outside consultant roles from 
one election cycle to the next, or even within a cycle.150 They may 
launch their careers by working directly for individual candi-
dates or party organizations, then affiliate with a consulting firm 
where they serve a range of campaign and non-campaign clients, 
 
GROUND WARS: PERSONALIZED COMMUNICATION IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
(2012). 
 145. See Issie Lapowsky, Obama Alums Pour $1.5 Million into Progressive 
Tech Startups, WIRED (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/obama 
-alums-pour-money-into-political-tech-startups. 
 146. SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 2; see also Grossmann, Campaigning, su-
pra note 3, at 7. 
 147. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 352–53; 
SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 10, 183. 
 148. Erin Quinn, Who Needs Lobbyists? See What Big Business Spends to 
Win American Minds, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www 
.publicintegrity.org/2015/01/15/16596/who-needs-lobbyists-see-what-big 
-business-spends-win-american-minds. 
 149. Id.; see also SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 191–92 (noting that WPP, the 
world’s largest public relations company, owns at least “twenty-six firms in the 
United States alone that specialize in political consulting, polling, and lobby-
ing[,]” with some serving Democratic clients and others serving Republican can-
didates). 
 150. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 109, at 18 (reporting that “more than two 
dozen Obama campaign alumni . . . [went] on to consulting ventures that collec-
tively earned millions in the . . . [2014] midterm”); The ‘Shadow’ Republican 
Party, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/ 
10/29/us/politics/the-shadow-republican-party.html (discussing professionals’ 
migration between party committees and independent groups). 
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and then perhaps return for stints as a high-level staffer or ad-
visor to candidates in especially prominent races.151 Profession-
als who assist winning candidates also sometimes follow those 
candidates into government.152 At least at senior levels, serving 
as an outside consultant tends to be more remunerative than 
working as a campaign or government staffer.153 While staff po-
sitions are usually salaried, consultants and vendors often re-
ceive hefty fees or commissions.154 Media consultants, for in-
stance, charge commissions as high as fifteen percent for buying 
advertising time on behalf of their clients.155 Given their ongoing 
relationships with one another and their shared economic inter-
ests, professionals often have more enduring loyalties to one an-
other than to the campaigners they happen to be assisting at any 
given time.156 
Professionals sometimes even wear multiple hats at once, 
working directly for a particular candidate as a staffer or advisor 
while maintaining ties to an outside consulting firm that pro-
vides services to the campaign.157 Journalists and other observ-
 
 151. See, e.g., The ‘Shadow’ Republican Party, supra note 150 (detailing the 
paths of various party-related officials from their former posts to their current 
roles as consultants). 
 152. See, e.g., Sarah Halzack, After Election, Campaign Staffers Likely To 
Descend on Washington in Search of Work, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2012), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/after-election-campaign 
-staffers-likely-to-descend-on-washington-in-search-of-work/2012/11/09/ 
d7a1b04e-2907-11e2-bab2-eda299503684_story.html; Eric Lipton & Danielle 
Ivory, How the Spoils Were Doled Out to Trump Campaign Workers and Allies, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/business/ 
trump-federal-jobs.html. 
 153. Dan Eggen & Tom Hamburger, Private Consultants See Huge Election 
Profits, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
decision2012/private-consultants-see-huge-election-profits/2012/11/10/ 
edaab580-29d8-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f_story.html. 
 154. Grossmann, Campaigning, supra note 3, at 10 (“The most commonly 
used compensation structure for consultants is payment by a percentage of ex-
penditures.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Carney, supra note 109, at 17. 
 156. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 43–44 (not-
ing the fraternity between consultants and their preference to rely on one an-
other instead of unknown quantities). 
 157. Harry Davies, Ted Cruz Erased Trump’s Iowa Lead by Spending Mil-
lions on Voter Targeting, GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2016/feb/01/ted-cruz-trump-iowa-caucus-voter-targeting (noting 
that Jeb Bush’s presidential campaign used the services of Deep Root Analytics, 
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(Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/04/15/14537/super-pac 
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ers have uncovered numerous instances of campaigns patroniz-
ing firms connected with campaign officials.158 During the 2016 
race, the Clinton and Trump campaigns—as well as the cam-
paigns of many of their primary challengers—directed millions 
of dollars to media, digital, and polling firms linked to their sen-
ior campaign strategists.159 In a prominently reported episode 
from the 2012 presidential race, a senior advisor to the Obama 
campaign purportedly opposed the campaign’s efforts to develop 
its own in-house ad buying tools because he saw them as a threat 
to the substantial commissions that his own media firm was re-
ceiving from the campaign.160 
More broadly, the campaign industry operates in a financial 
context highly susceptible to agency costs and waste. Most of 
 
-leaders-score-perks-political-donations (discussing instances in which Super 
PACs made payments to firms associated with the groups’ leaders). In addition, 
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Where the Money Went, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/10/20/donald-trumps-campaign-spending 
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campaign’s communications director was a senior executive); Andrew Perez & 
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Street Ad While His Firm Works for Wall Street, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 14, 
2016), http://www.ibtimes.com/political-capital/hillary-clinton-strategist 
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what campaign organizations spend on professional services 
does not come directly out of the pockets of those who make the 
spending decisions. Instead, the money comes from campaign do-
nors, who give specifically to underwrite campaigning.161 As a 
result, candidates and other campaign principals conceive of the 
opportunity costs associated with paying—or overpaying—for 
campaign services in fairly narrow terms. While they have an 
electoral interest in ensuring that campaign money is used 
wisely, they do not suffer a personal financial penalty if cam-
paign funds are misspent. Moreover, to the extent they are able 
to keep raising funds, they may feel less pressure to maximize 
the value of every dollar the campaign spends. The frenetic pace 
of campaigns can compound these tendencies by leaving cam-
paigners with little bandwidth to vet and supervise their service 
providers, who may in turn be prone to overcharge or cut cor-
ners.162 Even after the fact, scrutiny of campaign spending deci-
sions is often minimal. Winning candidates may be willing to 
overlook or excuse questionable payments or inefficiencies, while 
losers may simply move on.163 Similarly, although donors might 
balk if they see their money being squandered, they rarely learn 
the full details of how campaign funds are spent, and certainly 
not in real time.164 In any event, once contributions are made, 
 
 161. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN & BRENDAN GLAVIN, CFI’S GUIDE TO MONEY 
IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS 13–14 (2018), http://www.cfinst.org/pdf/federal/ 
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incumbents); J.T. Stepleton, The (Mostly) Unchanged Efficacy of Self-Funding 
a Political Campaign, FOLLOWTHEMONEY.ORG (July 28, 2016), https://www 
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(Jan. 31, 2018), http://www.tampabay.com/projects/2018/investigations/zombie 
-campaigns/spending-millions-after-office (reporting on many potential cam-
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and especially once they are spent, dissatisfied donors have min-
imal recourse.165 
Opportunities for campaign professionals to engage in self-
dealing and financial improprieties are especially pronounced in 
the context of Super PACs and their ilk. By law, such organiza-
tions must operate independently of the candidates they sup-
port, which precludes those candidates from playing any formal 
oversight role.166 Instead, campaign professionals often set up 
and manage these organizations themselves, effectively becom-
ing their own bosses.167 They then have latitude to make what-
ever spending decisions they choose, including determining their 
own salaries and fees and procuring services from consulting 
firms in which they have a stake.168 Unsurprisingly, profession-
als sometimes reap substantial financial rewards from their Su-
per PAC affiliations.169 In some instances, Super PACs spend the 
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bulk of their resources on professional fees.170 The apotheosis of 
these questionable practices is the so-called “scam PAC”—a term 
used to refer to entities that raise money largely for the personal 
benefit of their organizers.171 Beyond Super PACs, ballot initia-
tive campaigns can also present conditions favorable to self-en-
richment since professionals in such contests often lack the sort 
of oversight present in candidate elections.172 
One final descriptive point bears mention: although political 
scientists, journalists, and others have helped to expose the cam-
paign industry’s workings, a defining attribute of the industry is 
its relative opacity. For campaigners who seek to procure profes-
sional services, no central clearinghouse offers reviews, compar-
isons, or price quotes—a reality that heightens vetting and mon-
itoring challenges.173 Indeed, consultants and vendors 
 
PACs . . . are a source of income for political consultants[.]”). According to a tally 
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sometimes enter into agreements with their clients to keep com-
pensation arrangements confidential, which can make it difficult 
for campaigners to compare deals and determine whether they 
are being overcharged.174 Moreover, beyond looking at a profes-
sional’s win-loss record in prior races, which provides limited in-
sight, few objective performance metrics are available.175 Such 
information gaps may pose special challenges for inexperienced 
candidates, who often lack personal familiarity with industry 
practices and practitioners.176 
The industry’s affairs are perhaps even less visible to the 
broader public. While existing campaign finance disclosure re-
gimes generally require campaign committees to itemize their 
disbursements, they offer only a glimpse into campaigners’ ar-
rangements with professionals.177 At the federal level and in 
most states, campaigns need only disclose their gross payments 
to their direct service providers, without specifying how much 
those providers retain as fees or commissions, and how much 
they transfer to third parties.178 In practice, consulting firms 
commonly function partly as pass-through entities, buying goods 
and services and enlisting subcontractors on the campaign’s be-
half. To take a high-profile example from the 2016 presidential 
campaign, the research firm that compiled a dossier on ties be-
tween Donald Trump and Russia was paid in part by the Clinton 
campaign through the campaign’s lead law firm.179 The cam-
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paign disclosed payments to its law firm, but the campaign’s con-
nection to the research firm and the dossier remained con-
cealed.180 
Campaign professionals sometimes further obscure their 
dealings by operating through black box entities. Consider the 
twenty largest recipients of federal campaign funds during the 
2016 election cycle—service providers that collected an average 
of $96.7 million each in campaign revenue.181 While the majority 
are well established firms with public profiles, including web-
sites that advertise their offerings and identify key personnel,182 
at least seven are shrouded in mystery.183 Sleuthing journalists 
have linked some of these ghost entities to known firms,184 sug-
gesting that they are essentially shells created to serve at least 
one of two functions: they assure formal legal separation when a 
firm is simultaneously serving candidates and ostensibly inde-
pendent Super PACs, and they help to conceal campaign strate-
gies and activities from political rivals and other observers.185 
*** 
The central takeaway from the above discussion is this: the 
campaign industry has come to play a preeminent role in U.S. 
electoral politics. The protagonists in modern election contests 
are not just the competing candidates, parties, and interest 
groups, but also the professional service providers who have 
made politics their vocation. The next Part considers how these 
professionals—with their various incentives and entangle-
ments—affect the democratic process. 
II.  THE CAMPAIGN INDUSTRY’S SYSTEMIC IMPACTS   
The complex and fraught relationship between campaigners 
and campaign professionals can have major consequences for the 
success and failure of individual campaigns. But a bigger story 
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lurks behind these campaign level effects. The campaign indus-
try does not merely serve and disserve particular clients; it im-
pacts the political system as a whole. This Part focuses on these 
system level consequences, highlighting three in particular. 
First, campaign professionals serve a gatekeeping role, screen-
ing out certain types of candidates and screening in others. Sec-
ond, campaign professionals alter the nature of campaigning by 
systematically overemphasizing certain strategies and tech-
niques and underemphasizing others. Third, campaign profes-
sionals influence candidates’ policy positions and priorities in 
particular directions both during campaigns and after. 
As a preliminary matter, it bears noting that any analysis 
of the campaign industry’s effects requires a notion of how the 
system would look were the campaign industry not playing its 
current role. Several alternative universes seem plausible. One 
is a system in which the campaign industry retains its centrality 
but operates in a more restrained manner thanks to altered in-
centives or increased oversight (along the lines discussed in Part 
IV). A second possibility is a system in which traditional political 
party organizations have been revitalized, perhaps with the help 
of legal reforms, so that they again play the sort of dominant role 
that they did in the past. A final option is to accept political par-
ties in their modern, weakened state and then to envision a 
world in which campaign professionals have been ousted as the 
chief suppliers of election-related services. Idealists might 
dream that stripping the electoral process of both strong parties 
and campaign professionals would usher in a golden age of grass-
roots activism and enlightened democratic engagement. But that 
seems improbable, especially at a time when many civic associa-
tions and other traditional mediating institutions are strug-
gling.186 Instead, sidelining campaign professionals would likely 
make the media, both old and new, even more influential as a 
platform for candidates and source of information for the elec-
torate. The 2016 Trump campaign arguably points toward this 
possibility. Compared to other recent presidential contenders, 
Trump relied somewhat less on paid staff and consultants 
 
 186. See, e.g., Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Beyond Campaign Finance Reform, 57 
B.C. L. Rev. 1127, 1133 (2016) (discussing “the political disorganization of ordi-
nary American citizens” and urging steps toward “civic reorganization”); Kate 
Andrias, Hollowed-Out Democracy, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 48 (2014); 
Kate Andrias, Separations of Wealth: Inequality and the Erosion of Checks and 
Balances, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 419, 421 (2015). 
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(though he still had many) and instead pursued a strategy that 
centered on maximizing free media attention.187 
Maintaining such a comparative perspective is important. It 
offers a reminder that, while the campaign industry has far-
reaching impacts, the industry cannot be blamed for every per-
ceived shortcoming of the political system. Other modes of cam-
paigning would likely reproduce at least some of the status quo’s 
imperfections, and generate new problems of their own.188 Mind-
ful of this reality, the Sections below focus on ways in which the 
existing regime of campaign industry primacy appears to differ 
from at least one of the plausible alternatives—namely, from (1) 
a system in which the campaign industry retains its clout, but 
faces certain new constraints; (2) a system in which party organ-
izations hold relatively greater sway; and (3) a system in which 
the media predominates even more than at present. 
A. CANDIDATE SELECTION EFFECTS 
Initially, campaign professionals play an important gate-
keeping role. They often choose candidates as much as candi-
dates choose them.189 This not only means deciding whether to 
take on or seek out particular candidates as clients; it can also 
mean actively working to identify and recruit candidates.190 
Even at the presidential level, professionals routinely play an 
 
 187. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to 
American Democracy), 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 212–13 (2017); Sanford 
Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50 IND. 
L. REV. 281, 320–21 (2016); Mary Harris, A Media Post-Mortem on the 2016 
Presidential Election, MEDIAQUANT (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.mediaquant 
.net/2016/11/a-media-post-mortem-on-the-2016-presidential-election. 
 188. Cf. STEPHEN K. MEDVIC, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN U.S. CONGRES-
SIONAL ELECTIONS 148 (2001) [hereinafter MEDVIC, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS] 
(“Those clinging to an ideal of the ‘golden age of campaigning’ ought to be disa-
bused of such a notion.”). 
 189. See Sabato, Political Influence, supra note 5, at 16 (“[C]onsult-
ants . . . have a great deal of influence on which candidates succeed and which 
don’t.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Andy Kroll, New Koch-linked Political Firm Aims to Handpick 
“Electable” Candidates, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.mother 
jones.com/politics/2014/01/koch-brothers-candidate-training-recruiting-aegis 
-strategic; Kara B. Turrentine, How to Navigate Candidate Recruitment, CAM-
PAIGNS & ELECTIONS (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.campaignsandelections.com/ 
campaign-insider/how-to-navigate-candidate-recruitment; Kenneth P. Vogel, 
How the Kochs Launched Joni Ernst, POLITICO (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www 
.politico.com/story/2015/11/the-kochs-vs-the-gop-215672; Jason Zengerle, The 
Most Powerful Man in the GOP (And You’ve Never Heard of Him), GQ (Feb. 17, 
2016), https://www.gq.com/story/rex-elsass-secret-wizard-of-the-far-right. 
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instrumental role in grooming potential candidates and persuad-
ing them to run.191 
These early judgments by professionals can significantly af-
fect who seeks and wins elective office.192 This is partly because 
professional services directly help candidates mount viable cam-
paigns,193 but also because professionals—and especially highly 
regarded ones—can serve to validate candidates by choosing to 
affiliate with them. A top professional’s decision to work with a 
particular candidate can help that candidate draw early interest 
and funds.194 For political elites and the media, a candidate’s 
success in building an all-star professional team signals the can-
didate’s strength.195 Conversely, failing to attract top-tier staff 
and consultants can derail a candidacy from the outset.196 
As campaign professionals select their candidate clients, 
they tend to prioritize several key criteria. These criteria differ 
 
 191. See JOHNSON, DEMOCRACY FOR HIRE, supra note 1, at 5 (“A political 
consultant persuaded Barry Goldwater to run for the presidency, and political 
consultants helped prepare a political novice, the one-time movie actor Ronald 
Reagan, in his quest for the governor’s office in California. . . . A consultant 
helped build the career of George W. Bush and persuade him to run for the 
presidency.”). The phenomenon of the campaign professional as candidate re-
cruiter has even been portrayed in film. See THE CANDIDATE (Warner Bros. 
1972) (depicting a fictional political consultant’s effort to recruit a candidate 
into a seemingly hopeless U.S. Senate race). 
 192. See Sabato, Political Influence, supra note 5, at 16. 
 193. See, e.g., Johnson, Campaign Consultants, supra note 32, at 56–59 (de-
scribing the important role consultants play in helping candidates run disci-
plined and cohesive campaigns). 
 194. See, e.g., MEDVIC, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 188, at 126 
(“[T]he mere presence of a political consultant sends a message to potential con-
tributors . . . especially . . . when the consultant has something of a reputa-
tion.”); James A. Thurber, Introduction to the Study of Campaign Consultants, 
in CAMPAIGN WARRIORS: THE ROLE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS IN ELECTIONS 
5 (James A. Thurber & Candice J. Nelson eds., 2000); Medvic, The Effectiveness, 
supra note 123 at 150 (noting a correlation between the use of campaign con-
sultants and an increase in a candidate’s likelihood of raising more money). 
 195. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 121, at 376–77 (explaining that hiring repu-
table consultants influences the perceived competitiveness of a race); see also 
De Vries, supra note 85, at 22 (“Candidates today are often judged by their sta-
ble of consultants. One takes a look at who has been retained by the candidate 
and, based on that judgment, makes a decision about the viability of that can-
didate’s campaign.”). 
 196. See Celinda Lake, Political Consultants: Opening Up a New System of 
Political Power, 22 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 26, 26 (1989). 
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from the ones that most citizens will later use to make their vot-
ing decisions.197 They also diverge in part from the selection cri-
teria that would prevail if parties or the media exerted relatively 
greater electoral influence. Party organizations would presuma-
bly favor candidates with a record of loyalty and service to the 
party and perhaps also candidates perceived to be especially ca-
pable of advancing the party’s substantive agenda. Media-domi-
nated campaigns, meanwhile, would presumably favor effective 
communicators with big personalities and perhaps also ad-
vantage candidates with preexisting public profiles. Such candi-
date attributes may be relevant to campaign professionals, but 
they typically take a backseat to other considerations. 
First, because campaign professionals want to get paid, and 
preferably more rather than less, professionals consider a candi-
date’s fundraising potential.198 In a survey of 200 political con-
sultants, ninety-eight percent reported that “a candidate’s abil-
ity to raise money and pay the bills was either very or somewhat 
important.”199 Other research has indicated “that more consult-
ants cared about whether their clients could pay their bills than 
whether they were capable of governing.”200 The market for pro-
fessional campaign services thus amplifies the electoral system’s 
tendency to favor “candidates who are themselves wealthy or 
have networks of wealthy friends . . . relative to candidates with 
other kinds of political skills.”201 Commentators sometimes dis-
cuss the phenomenon of the “money primary,” in which candi-
dates compete to attract early momentum-generating funds.202 
But potential candidates may not even enter the money primary 
if they fare poorly in the consultant beauty pageant.203 
 
 197. Cf. SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 337 (“A candi-
date’s adaptability to the new techniques of campaigning, not his competence, 
has become the standard by which he is judged by political professionals[.]”). 
 198. Cain, supra note 121, at 378. 
 199. James A. Thurber et al., Portrait of Campaign Consultants, in CAM-
PAIGN WARRIORS, supra note 194, at 16 [hereinafter Thurber, Portrait]. 
 200. Cain, supra note 121, at 378; see also Sabato, Political Influence, supra 
note 5, at 16. 
 201. Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 3, at 232. 
 202. See, e.g., DAVID B. MAGLEBY & CANDICE J. NELSON, THE MONEY CHASE: 
CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 66 (1990); Tom Donnelly, Candi-
date Venture Capital, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 753 (2012) (discussing the importance 
of early money in a campaign); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection 
and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 273 (1993). 
 203. See Lake, supra note 196, at 26. 
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Second, campaign professionals assess a candidate’s likeli-
hood of electoral success.204 Professionals are sometimes willing 
to work with long-shot candidates, especially ones with deep 
pockets.205 After all, professionals can distinguish themselves by 
guiding long shots to victory, while explaining away losses as in-
evitable. But, on the whole, professionals generally prefer to 
have more winning races on their resume than losing ones.206 
For better or for worse, this may make professionals—at least 
the most well-established and reputable ones—risk-averse in 
their choice of candidates, potentially giving conventional candi-
dates a boost over unconventional ones and incumbents a boost 
over challengers.207 
Both of these considerations have implications for candidate 
diversity. If professionals prefer candidates who are connected 
to wealthy donor networks—networks that are disproportion-
ately Caucasian and male—and who resemble candidates who 
have succeeded in the past,208 then minorities and women may 
find themselves at a particular disadvantage.209 The campaign 
industry’s own demographics may reinforce this dynamic.210 
Women and minorities are significantly underrepresented 
among campaign service providers.211 According to one study, 
 
 204. See Thurber, Portrait, supra note 199, at 15 (reporting that overwhelm-
ing majorities of surveyed consultants described the “probability of a candidate 
winning” as “very or somewhat important in their calculus for selecting their 
clients”). 
 205. See Lake, supra note 196, at 26 
 206. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
 207. See SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 215 (“[T]he business of politics contrib-
utes to the entrenchment of a political elite . . . .”). 
 208. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Aligning Campaign Finance 
Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1426 (2015). 
 209. Cf. Jennifer L. Lawless, Female Candidates and Legislators, 18 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 349, 355 (2015) (“[A]mong potential candidates, men are about 
15% more likely than women to have received the suggestion to run for office, 
from a party leader, elected official, or nonelected political activist . . . .”); Paru 
Shah, It Takes a Black Candidate: A Supply-Side Theory of Minority Represen-
tation, 67 POL. RES. Q. 266 (2014) (concluding that lack of candidate recruitment 
is an obstacle to minority representation). 
 210. Cf. Kate Maeder, Why Female Consultants Matter Right Now, CAM-
PAIGNS & ELECTIONS (May, 17, 2017), https://www.campaignsandelections.com/ 
campaign-insider/why-female-consultants-matter-right-now (suggesting that 
the paucity of women in the political consulting industry hinders efforts to elect 
more women to office). 
 211. See Thurber, Portrait, supra note 199, at 12 (reporting survey results 
indicating “that principals in the major campaign consulting firms are primarily 
white and male”). 
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less than two percent of payments the National Democratic cam-
paign committees made to consultants during the 2010 and 2012 
cycles went to minority-run firms.212 And women comprise just 
thirty-two percent of the membership of the American Associa-
tion of Political Consultants.213 Perhaps unsurprisingly, studies 
indicate that political insiders encourage women to run for office 
less often than they encourage men, even though women are 
equally responsive to such suggestions when asked.214  
An additional factor that consultants may consider in choos-
ing candidates—though they may be understandably reluctant 
to admit it—is a candidate’s perceived pliability. All else being 
equal, professionals presumably prefer to work with candidates 
who will be inclined to accept their advice and give them fairly 
wide latitude to act.215 To the extent they find such candidates, 
professionals can reinforce their dominance in ways that may 
magnify both the agency costs discussed in Section I.B and the 
campaign and policy effects discussed below. 
 
 212. Aaron Blake, Democrats Spend Very Little on Minority-Run Consulting 
Firms, Study Finds, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/06/25/democrats-spend-very-little-on-minority-run 
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 213. See Email from Allison Kramer-Mills, Admin. Specialist, Am. Ass’n of 
Political Consultants, to Anna Collins Peterson (Nov. 28, 2017, 15:08 CST) (on 
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over the past two decades. See Costas Panagopoulos et al., Lady Luck? Women 
Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Campaigns, 10 J. POL. MARKETING 
251, 260 (2011) (finding that, among consulting firms working in U.S. House 
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 214. See Lawless, supra note 209, at 355. 
 215. See, e.g., LATHROP, supra note 137, at 5–6 (“Some consultants, in their 
more candid moments, confess that they do not respect many of their political 
clients . . . .”); Molly Ball, ‘There’s Nothing Better than a Scared, Rich Candi-
date:’ How Political Consulting Works—Or Doesn’t, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/10/theres-nothing-better 
-than-a-scared-rich-candidate/497522 (suggesting that such motivations lay be-
hind the effort to recruit Ben Carson in the 2016 presidential race); cf. JAMES 
MOORE & WAYNE SLATER, BUSH’S BRAIN: HOW KARL ROVE MADE GEORGE W. 
BUSH PRESIDENTIAL (2003) (describing Karl Rove’s extensive influence on the 
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B. CAMPAIGN EFFECTS 
Beyond shaping the pool of candidates who seek office, cam-
paign professionals influence the nature of campaigning. This 
occurs in large part because some modes of campaigning gener-
ate revenue for the campaign industry more readily and reliably 
than others.216 In particular, producing mass media ads and pur-
chasing advertising slots have long been especially profitable ac-
tivities for campaign professionals.217 Political scientists Greg-
ory Martin and Zachary Peskowitz recently estimated that “a 
campaign must pay a consulting firm between $1.41 and $1.44 
to produce $1 worth of advertising.”218 For Super PACs, the av-
erage markup is even greater, with such entities paying media 
consultants a remarkable “$2.51–$2.69 to generate $1 worth of 
advertising.”219 In contrast, field organizing and activities such 
as door-to-door canvassing have traditionally been more difficult 
to monetize.220 As a result, professionals have long touted and 
facilitated campaigns that prioritize paid advertising through 
mass media, even though empirical evidence suggests that retail 
 
 216. Cf. SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 312–13 (“[P]olit-
ical professionals have surely added to the spiral of campaign costs, not merely 
by charging exorbitant fees and commissions . . . but also by making enor-
mously expensive technologies standard items in modern campaigns.”); Gross-
mann, Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 98 (“Like in most professions, consultants’ 
ideology of client service sometimes correlates strongly with their financial in-
terests.”). 
 217. SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 213. 
 218. Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 3, at 236. 
 219. Id. at 238. 
 220. See David Broockman & Joshua Kalla, Experiments Show This Is the 
Best Way To Win Campaigns. But Is Anyone Actually Doing It?, VOX (Nov. 13, 
2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/11/13/7214339/campaign-ground-game. This 
has been changing somewhat in recent years as campaign professionals have 
come to offer technology and data-related services to help campaigns identify 
the right voters to target for personalized contacts. See, e.g., Alicia Kolar 
Prevost, The Ground Game: Fieldwork in Political Campaigns, in CAMPAIGNS 
AND ELECTIONS AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 2, at 198. 
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politicking can offer candidates more bang for the buck.221 In-
deed, some studies suggest that paid advertising often has little 
marginal effect on voters’ candidate preferences.222 
By overemphasizing mass advertising, campaign profes-
sionals end up promoting a quite superficial form of democratic 
engagement.223 It is superficial in the sense that it views citizens 
as passive spectators rather than as active participants.224 Little 
is asked of citizens beyond their dollars and their votes. It is also 
superficial in the sense that advertising is not conducive to high-
level discourse. Professionals distill a campaign’s message to 
soundbites that focus on some mix of salient wedge issues and 
the personal characteristics of the candidates.225 Along the way, 
nuance is lost, and community-specific issues may get over-
looked. Contrary to the aphorism that all politics is local, cam-
paign professionals—who frequently work on races in unfamiliar 
places—may help make even local politics national.226 
 
 221. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 5; Ball, supra note 215 (discussing 
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during the 2016 presidential campaign); Danielle Kurtzleben, 2016 Campaigns 
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focus on personal characteristics); Grossmann, Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 
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Although the empirical evidence is by no means decisive, 
campaign professionals may also bear at least some responsibil-
ity for the high level of negativity in many campaigns.227 In sur-
veys, large majorities of campaign professionals say that they 
see negative advertising as an appropriate and effective strat-
egy.228 Candidates who find negativity distasteful may be more 
willing to go negative if that is what the experts recommend.229 
Negativity levels do appear to have risen in recent decades, cor-
responding in time to the campaign industry’s rise.230 In some 
instances, professionals are also behind dirty tricks and un-
seemly campaign practices.231 A recurring example is push poll-
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NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING: THE SECRETS OF THE PROS (1998) (describing the var-
ious rationales of political consultants who use negative ads); Richard R. Lau & 
Ivy Brown Rovner, Negative Campaigning, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 285 (2009) 
(reviewing literature on the use and effects of negative campaigning). 
 229. Grossmann, Campaigning, supra note 3, at 3 (“Candidates with con-
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& Robin Stryker, Freedom of Speech, Liberal Democracy, and Emerging Evi-
dence on Civility and Effective Democratic Engagement, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 375, 
426–27 (2012); Zengerle, supra note 190 (describing tactics consultants used to 
persuade candidates to go negative). 
 230. See Massaro & Stryker, supra note 229, at 421. 
 231. See, e.g., MEDVIC, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 188, at 156 
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ing, which involves conveying negative (and typically false) in-
formation about a political candidate under the guise of a tele-
phone poll.232 
Campaign professionals’ promotion of capital-intensive 
campaign strategies over more frugal approaches goes hand in 
hand with a fixation on fundraising. Professionals drill into their 
clients the message that money must continually flow in the 
door.233 The fundraising process is itself professionalized, with 
consultants sometimes taking a cut of the contributions that 
they help generate.234 By pushing more money into politics, the 
campaign industry is complicit in the various pathologies that 
critics of the campaign finance system lament.235 
All of this, in turn, may produce campaigns that breed cyni-
cism and disaffection among the public.236 With more money en-
tering the electoral system and the campaign industry booming, 
public dissatisfaction with campaigns has grown.237 People not 
only see deep-pocketed interests attempting to exert outsized in-
fluence over voters and politicians; they also see campaign insid-
ers opportunistically seeking to enrich themselves in the pro-
cess.238 Even when campaign professionals serve their clients 
well in the narrow sense of helping them prevail over rivals, they 
may be propagating methods of electioneering that disserve de-
mocracy writ large. 
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To be clear, the campaign industry is by no means solely to 
blame for the imperfections of campaigns. Party operatives are 
certainly capable of negative campaigning,239 and many media 
outlets do little to elevate the quality of electoral discourse or to 
promote citizen engagement.240 That said, if parties or the media 
supplanted the campaign industry, electioneering would likely 
look at least somewhat different. Perhaps parties would be wary 
of excessive negativity for fear of doing long-term damage to 
their brands. And to the extent they were reinvigorated at the 
local level, perhaps they would generate campaigns that rely 
more on grassroots activism and less on paid advertising. Simi-
larly, perhaps media-centered campaigning would reduce cam-
paigners’ preoccupation with fundraising. Even without displac-
ing the campaign industry, reforms might alter the industry’s 
incentives in ways that incrementally improve campaigning.  
C. POLICY EFFECTS 
Campaign professionals not only influence candidate selec-
tion and campaign tactics and tone. They also can shape policy, 
both during campaigns and after.241 According to survey re-
search on the industry, candidates tend to focus mainly on the 
high-level strategic plans for their campaigns, leaving profes-
sionals in the driver’s seat “when it comes to setting issue prior-
ities” and “the day-to-day tactical operation of the campaign.”242 
In their policy development role, campaign professionals are pre-
sumably attentive to their clients’ preexisting positions and com-
mitments, but they also bring their own judgment to bear. As 
they do, they may be guided in part by personal views, which 
may or may not precisely align with the views of their clients.243 
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 240. Cf. SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 322 (“The un-
paid media are just as wedded to the carnival aspects of politics, and politicians 
willingly embrace them.”). 
 241. See, e.g., LATHROP, supra note 137, at 136 (“[P]olitical consultants have 
become indispensable advisors to decision makers on major policy matters.”); 
SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 36; Sabato, Political Influ-
ence, supra note 5, at 16; Zengerle, supra note 190 (discussing consultants’ par-
ticular influence on the policy positions of “rookie candidates”). 
 242. Petracca, supra note 223, at 13; see also Grossmann, Going Pro?, supra 
note 83, at 101 (“[M]any of the important decisions in campaigns are now made 
by consultants . . . .”); Walton & Weller, supra note 123, at 5 (noting a percep-
tion that candidates “have been captured by their consultants”). 
 243. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 314 (ob-
  
192 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:151 
 
And, deliberately or not, they also may consider the interests of 
other clients.244 
As previously discussed, campaign professionals—espe-
cially outside consultants—often serve, or have served, many 
masters. A professional, for instance, who has worked for foreign 
governments or for foreign officials’ campaigns may convey a fa-
vorable impression of those actors to domestic candidate clients. 
The same goes for professionals who have done, or seek to do, 
public relations work on behalf of corporations or trade associa-
tions.245 Indeed, keeping company with campaign professionals 
may be an effective way for deep-pocketed interests to gain the 
favor of office seekers.246 The myriad entanglements of former 
Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort offer a high-profile illus-
tration of these concerns. Earlier in his career, Manafort paired 
work on the presidential campaigns of Gerald Ford, Ronald 
Reagan, and Bob Dole, with work on behalf of several foreign 
dictators, including Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and 
Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.247 
He also co-founded a lobbying firm.248 More recently, he worked 
for Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs and for pro-Russian politi-
cal parties in Ukraine, where he helped elect Russian-backed 
Viktor Yanukovych.249 Even during his tenure with the Trump 
campaign, Manafort apparently offered private briefings to a 
 
serving that pollsters sometimes “fail to make a clear distinction between sur-
vey findings and their own opinions”). 
 244. Cf. Cain, supra note 121, at 377 (“[T]he political consultants who craft 
and implement campaign strategies do not always share the same goals as their 
clients. . . . Consultants’ goals include advancing their own beliefs or ideologies 
and making money . . . .”). 
 245. Lake, supra note 196, at 27–28 (reporting that “trade association[s] and 
power-brokers know that consultants have a unique kind of access to the polit-
ical system” and that these “patterns of access . . . have real implications for 
policy outcomes”). 
 246. Sabato, Political Influence, supra note 5, at 16 (explaining that “private 
lobby groups, corporate clients and labor union clients” hire campaign profes-
sionals “because they have influence”). 
 247. Andrew Prokop, Paul Manafort’s Central Role in the Trump-Russia In-
vestigation, Explained, VOX (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and 
-politics/2017/8/31/16125776/paul-manafort-russia-trump-mueller. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.; see, e.g., David A. Graham, Former Trump Campaign Chair Paul 
Manafort Faces 12 Federal Charges, ATLANTIC (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www 
.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/report-former-trump-chair-paul 
-manafort-and-partner-told-to-surrender/544331; Paul Wood, Manafort Earned 
$600,000 a Month from Pro-Russia Party: Ukrainian Report, USA TODAY (Oct. 
31, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/10/31/manafort 
-pro-russia-party-report/816242001. 
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Kremlin-aligned Russian billionaire for whom he had worked.250 
Ongoing investigations may ultimately reveal more about the ex-
tent to which these foreign entanglements tainted Manafort’s 
work with Trump.251 
Campaign professionals, moreover, often remain close to 
successful candidates once those candidates take office, enjoying 
privileged influence and access even if they lack a formal role 
within the government.252 In some instances, they overtly use 
their insider status to market themselves to private-sector or for-
eign-government clients and then seek to deliver policy results 
for those clients.253 The Trump presidency has provided some 
vivid examples of campaign officials leveraging their relation-
ships with the White House on behalf of their clients. Consider 
former Trump campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, who 
serves as an informal adviser to the President while also actively 
marketing his close White House ties as he offers consulting ser-
vices to corporations and foreign officials.254 He also advises the 
Vice President’s leadership PAC and frequently appears as a ca-
ble news contributor.255 The phenomenon, however, is not 
 
 250. Tom Hamburger et al., Manafort Offered To Give Russian Billionaire 
‘Private Briefings’ on 2016 Campaign, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/manafort-offered-to-give-russian-billionaire 
-private-briefings-on-2016-campaign/2017/09/20/399bba1a-9d48-11e7-8ea1 
-ed975285475e_story.html; Jeff Horwitz & Chad Day, AP Exclusive: Before 
Trump Job, Manafort Worked To Aid Putin, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://apnews.com/122ae0b5848345faa88108a03de40c5a/Manafort%27s-plan 
-to-%27greatly-benefit-the-Putin-Government%27. 
 251. See, e.g., Chris Strohm, Mueller’s Latest Charges Bring Together Trump 
Campaign, Russia, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2018-06-09/mueller-s-latest-charges-bring-together-trump 
-campaign-russia. 
 252. See, e.g., LATHROP, supra note 137, at 3–4; De Vries, supra note 85, at 
23; Novotny, supra note 82, at 21; Bergo, supra note 136. 
 253. See Bergo, supra note 136. 
 254. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Kenneth P. Vogel, Trump Loyalist 
Mixes Businesses and Access at ‘Advisory’ Firm, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/corey-lewandowski-trump 
.html; Kenneth P. Vogel & Josh Dawsey, Lewandowski’s Firm Appears to Offer 
Trump Meetings, POLITICO (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/ 
04/28/corey-lewandowski-trump-meetings-237725. 
 255. See Christopher Cadelago, Trump’s Outside Advisers See Little Upside 
in Joining White House as Staff, POLITICO (June 18, 2018), https://www. 
politico.com/story/2018/06/18/trump-white-house-staff-advisers-650868; Theod-
oric Meyer & Margaret Harding McGill, Lewandowski Advising T-Mobile on 
Sprint Merger, POLITICO (May 25, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/ 
05/25/corey-lewandowski-tmobile-consultant-sprint-merger-609168. 
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new,256 and it exists not just at the federal level, but at the state 
and local levels as well.257 
Perhaps more subtly, the campaign industry also may be 
making policymaking itself more campaign-like. Interest groups 
and corporations increasingly hire campaign professionals to de-
ploy campaign-style tactics to achieve policy goals.258 Some have 
suggested that these tactics—including attack ads and public 
mobilization efforts—have made lawmaking more divisive, hin-
dering collaboration and compromise.259 Again, campaign pro-
fessionals are not responsible for every defect in the policymak-
ing process, but their complicated allegiances and incentives 
nevertheless raise real concerns—concerns that would not arise, 
at least in the same form, if the industry played a more circum-
scribed role. 
III.  CONCEPTUAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS   
Given its centrality to modern politics and its far-reaching 
effects, the campaign industry inevitably interacts with other 
structural features of the U.S. electoral system. As discussed in 
Part I, the campaign industry came to dominate and shape our 
politics thanks, in large part, to a favorable institutional cli-
mate—one that weakened political parties while allowing money 
to flow relatively unimpeded. Just as those institutional features 
had implications for the campaign industry, the campaign indus-
try today has implications for campaign finance and political 
parties. This Part assesses those implications. It considers what 
the campaign industry’s rise suggests about the constitutionality 
and propriety of regulating money in politics and about the 
structure and reform of political parties. 
 
 256. In the late 1990s, for example, concerns were raised about pollsters who 
worked for the 1996 Clinton campaign and retained ties to the administration 
while also “working for a growing roster of corporate clients.” Novotny, supra 
note 82, at 18–19. 
 257. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 309–10; 
Bergo, supra note 136; Jason Hancock, Missouri Legislative Staffers Earn Big 
Money as Political Consultants, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 20, 2015), https://www 
.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article50828510.html; Ken Lovett, 
Growing Trend Finds Political Consultants Lobbying Those They Get Elected, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/daily 
politics/growing-trend-finds-political-consultants-lobbying-elected-blog-entry-1 
.1694448. 
 258. See supra notes 136–41 and accompanying text. 
 259. See LATHROP, supra note 137, at 150–51 (offering the Clinton-era de-
bate over health care reform as a case study). 
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A. MONEY IN POLITICS 
Existing discourse about money in politics largely overlooks 
the campaign industry’s pivotal role. Campaign professionals 
drive fundraising efforts and steer spending decisions, and sig-
nificant sums end up in their pockets.260 Recognizing these real-
ities adds a new dimension to longstanding jurisprudential de-
bates about the relationship between money and speech and, 
relatedly, the nature and scope of the constitutional rights at 
stake in campaign finance cases. It also casts new light on prom-
inent campaign reform proposals and perhaps suggests new di-
rections for reformers. 
The Supreme Court has long regarded the giving and spend-
ing of campaign funds as inextricably intertwined with cam-
paign speech.261 It has thus deemed campaign finance regulation 
a matter of core First Amendment concern.262 In one sense, the 
campaign industry’s centrality to the electoral process bolsters 
the notion of a constitutionally significant connection between 
money and speech. While case law has stressed the need for cam-
paigners to pay for various modes of mass communication,263 
modern American electioneering is even more deeply transac-
tional and market driven than existing judicial accounts recog-
nize. Practically speaking, paid service providers have become 
crucial and arguably indispensable facilitators of electioneering. 
They are alchemists who purport to transform money into advo-
cacy and, ultimately, into votes.264 Whatever one’s normative 
views of the matter, if our system treats campaigning as a mar-
ket-based activity, then the right to engage in electoral advocacy 
may indeed presuppose a right to finance campaigns.265 
 
 260. See supra notes 161–72 and accompanying text. 
 261. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976) (per curiam). 
 262. See, e.g., id.; Deborah Hellman, Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2011) (“Buckley’s central claim is that restrictions on 
giving and spending money should be treated as restrictions on ‘speech’ as that 
term is used in the First Amendment.”). 
 263. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. 
 264. Cf. SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 201 (“If the nineteenth-century alche-
mists of American politics turned whiskey into votes, modern-day consultants 
transform political contributions into the ubiquitous advertisements and polls 
of contemporary campaigns.”). 
 265. See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The right to speak would 
be largely ineffective if it did not include the right to engage in financial trans-
actions that are the incidents of its exercise.”); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (“Under 
a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal 
or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide 
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That said, attending to the campaign industry’s role may 
undercut the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence 
more than reinforce it. The reason is that, even as campaign pro-
fessionals capitalize on the link between money and speech, 
their intermediation attenuates the money-speech nexus in 
ways that existing case law fails to acknowledge. As others have 
observed, the Court’s precedents offer two basic accounts of how 
campaign finance restrictions offend the First Amendment.266 
One emphasizes the threat that regulations pose to the expres-
sive autonomy and individual liberty of campaign funders.267 
The other maintains that regulations unduly constrain or distort 
the marketplace of ideas.268 Though these accounts often com-
mingle in the Court’s opinions, they reflect analytically distinct 
concerns. It is thus worth disentangling them to see how the 
campaign industry’s presence tempers each concern and, as a re-
sult, challenges the aggressively anti-regulatory views that the 
Court has sometimes espoused, particularly in its more recent 
cases.269 
Consider first the Court’s conception of how campaign fi-
nance regulations impact expressive autonomy. Since Buckley, 
the Court has subjected limits on campaign contributions to a 
somewhat less stringent standard of review than limits on inde-
pendent expenditures.270 This differential treatment is partly 
based on the Court’s perception that contribution limits do not 
encumber the expression of would-be funders as directly and 
substantially as expenditure limits.271 According to the Court, 
 
the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign.”); Hellman, supra 
note 262, at 985–86 (“If a constitutional right depends on a good that is distrib-
uted via the market, then the right must be understood to include the right to 
spend money to exercise it.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Recovering the Individual in Politics, 15 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 264–65 (2012); Monica Youn, First Amend-
ment Fault Lines and the Citizens United Decision, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
135, 136–37 (2011). 
 267. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 266, at 264–65; Youn, supra note 266, at 136. 
 268. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 266, at 265; Youn, supra note 266, at 137. 
 269. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 
U.S. 721 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 270. Contributions refer to money given to candidate or party committees (or 
to entities that themselves give to those committees), while independent ex-
penditures are money that individuals or organizations spend on campaign ad-
vocacy independently—that is, without coordinating their activities with a can-
didate or party. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13, 19–21. 
 271. See id.; see also McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1444 (2014) (plurality opinion) (recounting Buckley’s expenditure-contribution 
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campaign donors communicate relatively little through their 
contributions: “A contribution serves as a general expression of 
support for the candidate and his views, but does not communi-
cate the underlying basis for the support.”272 Buckley described 
contributors as a step removed from whatever advocacy they fi-
nance because “the transformation of contributions into political 
debate involves speech by someone other than the contribu-
tor.”273 Elsewhere, the Court has called this “speech by proxy.”274 
In contrast, the Court equates election-related expenditures 
with “political speech.”275 As the Court explained it in Buckley, 
“[t]his is because virtually every means of communicating ideas 
in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”276 
The Court’s intuition has been that, if someone wants to share a 
campaign-related message and has to pay to convey it, then that 
expenditure is inseparable from the communication itself.277 
The Court’s contribution-expenditure distinction is already 
much maligned,278 but focusing on the campaign industry sug-
gests a new critique. Specifically, contrary to the distinction’s 
underlying premise, expenditures in practice tend not to be more 
expressive than contributions.279 No matter how funders inject 
their money into the electoral process, they are rarely dissemi-
nating their own autonomous, self-actualizing messages.280 In-
 
distinction); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 666 (1997). 
 272. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See, e.g., Cal. Med. Ass’n v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 453 U.S. 182, 196 
(1981) (plurality opinion); see also Youn, supra note 266, at 158. 
 275. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19, 39. 
 276. Id. at 19. 
 277. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340–
41 (2010); see also McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1448 
(2014) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing the First Amendment protections af-
forded to “someone who spends ‘substantial amounts of money in order to com-
municate [his] political ideas through sophisticated’ means” (quoting Fed. Elec-
tion Comm’n v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 
(1985))). 
 278. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, New Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law 
of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 747 (2007). 
 279. Albert W. Alschuler, Limiting Political Contributions After McCutch-
eon, Citizens United, and SpeechNow, 67 FLA. L. REV. 389, 475 (2015) (“Super 
PAC contributions have no greater communicative value than campaign contri-
butions.”). 
 280. Cf. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 
U.S. 604, 638–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Even in the 
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stead, whether they contribute to a candidate’s campaign organ-
ization or bankroll a Super PAC that independently engages in 
electoral advocacy, funders are underwriting professional ser-
vice providers who exercise substantial control over whether, 
when, and how electioneering will occur.281 Among other things, 
professionals make strategic choices about message content, em-
phasis, tone, and audience, which may result in communications 
that bear little resemblance to anything the funder might have 
chosen to say.282 
Contributions and independent expenditures thus both tend 
to reflect only general support for a campaign cause and leave 
proxies to figure out the rest. As a result, and contrary to the 
Supreme Court’s suggestion in Citizens United, expenditure lim-
its generally do not operate to deny would-be funders “the right 
to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect 
for the speaker’s voice.”283 This is not meant to imply that cam-
paign givers and spenders lack constitutionally protected inter-
ests. Instead, the upshot is that, from an autonomy perspective, 
expenditures are akin to contributions, and, accordingly, ex-
penditure limits may not warrant a higher level of judicial scru-
tiny than contribution limits.284 
The campaign industry similarly complicates the Court’s 
second account of the harm associated with campaign finance 
regulations—namely, that regulation encumbers the free ex-
change of information and ideas, arguably to the detriment of 
democratic self-governance.285 This account draws on a First 
Amendment tradition that prioritizes “the public’s interest in re-
ceiving information” and embraces “more speech, not less, [as] 
 
case of a direct expenditure, there is usually some go-between that facilitates the 
dissemination of the spender’s message . . . .”). 
 281. See Youn, supra note 266, at 140–41. 
 282. See id. 
 283. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010). 
 284. Justice Stevens similarly advocated dispensing with Buckley’s contri-
bution-expenditure distinction and ratcheting down the level of scrutiny appli-
cable to expenditures, though not based specifically on the role of the campaign 
industry. See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 273–81 (2006) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399 (2000) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).  
 285. See, e.g., Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 
U.S. 721, 750 (2011); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (invoking “the ‘open mar-
ketplace’ of ideas protected by the First Amendment”). 
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the governing rule.”286 Especially in recent years, the Court has 
given top billing to this free-market perspective, invoking the ex-
pressive interests of individual funders only secondarily.287 The 
free-market view featured prominently in Citizens United, 
where the Court emphatically condemned restrictions on corpo-
rate campaign expenditures, despite corporations’ questionable 
claims to expressive autonomy.288 The free-market account is 
also central to ongoing debates about the contribution-expendi-
ture distinction. Individual Justices have urged the Court to jet-
tison the distinction and subject all financing restrictions to 
strict scrutiny on the ground that “[c]ontributions to political 
campaigns, no less than direct expenditures, ‘generate essential 
political speech.’”289 Though the Court has not gone that far, its 
2014 decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission 
“subtly ratcheted up the . . . standard of review of contribution 
restrictions.”290 
The Court’s view that campaign finance regulations invari-
ably stifle electoral discourse rests in part on assumptions about 
campaigning that the activities and incentives of the campaign 
industry call into doubt. From Buckley forward, the Court has 
envisioned financial inputs being directly converted into speech 
 
 286. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (plural-
ity opinion); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361; see also First Nat’l Bank of Bos. 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978). 
 287. See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 266, at 266. 
 288. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 341 (“The Government may not 
by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to determine for 
itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration.”), with id. at 466–
67 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that “cor-
porations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no thoughts, no desires” 
and asserting that corporate expenditure regulations threaten “no one’s auton-
omy, dignity, or political equality”). 
 289. McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t 
PAC, 528 U.S. at 412 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Justice Thomas wrote separately 
in McCutcheon to endorse strict scrutiny for contribution limits. See 134 S. Ct. 
at 1462–65 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Nixon, 528 U.S. 
at 412–18 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign 
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 518 U.S. 604, 636–37 (1996) (Thomas, J., con-
curring in the judgment); Bradley A. Smith, Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, 
Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEO. L.J. 45, 55 n.70 (1997). 
 290. Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution 
Ban, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 397, 398 (2015); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445–
46 (plurality opinion) (casting the standard applicable to contribution limits as 
similarly “rigorous” to the standard applicable to expenditure limits); Robert 
Yablon, Campaign Finance Reform Without Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 185, 200–02 
(2017) (discussing the Court’s growing skepticism of contribution limits). 
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outputs—especially into “expensive modes of [mass media] com-
munication,” which the Court has called “indispensable instru-
ments” of modern electioneering.291 In reality, substantial sums 
end up in the pockets of campaign professionals, sometimes for 
services that clearly facilitate advocacy, but sometimes not.292 
As detailed above, self-interested professionals have pushed 
capital-intensive campaign strategies—strategies that may be 
good for their bottom lines, but that do not necessarily maximize 
the quantity or quality of campaign discourse.293 While effective 
electioneering no doubt requires a nontrivial amount of money, 
campaigns are expensive in part because campaign professionals 
help to make them expensive.294 The industry relentlessly pro-
motes its offerings and encourages campaigners to engage in re-
lentless fundraising to pay for them.295 Analysts generally agree 
that, as spending levels increase, campaigners obtain diminish-
ing marginal returns.296 Yet, from the perspective of profit-seek-
ing professionals, the marginal value of campaign funds never 
declines.297 If anything, it increases, because a campaign organ-
ization flush with cash can afford to be more generous toward its 
service providers. For professionals, bringing money in the door 
is worthwhile even after the money stops meaningfully advanc-
ing discourse and improving clients’ electoral prospects. 
Given these dynamics, campaign finance restrictions do not 
“necessarily reduce[] the quantity of [campaign] expression,” as 
the Court has long maintained.298 Reasonable contribution and 
expenditure limits might instead encourage campaigners to be 
more careful stewards of their funds and reduce some of the 
 
 291. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam); see also Wilson, 
supra note 3, at 685 (“A critical assumption of [the Court’s] free speech focus is 
the notion that the primary function of campaign funds is to buy communica-
tion. . . . Even proponents of spending limits who express concerns over equality 
and decry the ability of well-funded interests to ‘drown out’ the opposition often 
assume a simple correlation between money and message volume.”). 
 292. See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.  
 293. See supra Part II. 
 294. See supra notes 88–90, 233 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text. 
 296. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic 
Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 140 n.480 (2004); see also Chris W. Bonneau & 
Damon M. Cann, Campaign Spending, Diminishing Marginal Returns, and 
Campaign Finance Restrictions in Judicial Elections, 73 J. POL. 1267, 1267 
(2011). 
 297. See Bonneau & Cann, supra note 296, at 1268. 
 298. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam); see also Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (endorsing Buckley’s 
view that expenditure restrictions are necessarily speech-limiting). 
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windfall that professionals now receive. Limits also might accel-
erate the shift away from expensive Buckley-era mass communi-
cation methods toward lower-cost alternatives like social me-
dia.299 Budget-conscious campaigns might even end up devoting 
more attention to old-fashioned “direct one-on-one communica-
tion,” which the Supreme Court has called “the most effective, 
fundamental, and perhaps economical avenue of political dis-
course.”300 Of course, limits could be set so low that the level of 
campaign advocacy really would suffer, and at that point, strict 
constitutional scrutiny may indeed be warranted. But at least 
above that amount, treating every additional dollar as a unit of 
speech entitled to maximal First Amendment protection be-
comes harder to justify.301 
This analysis may suggest that the Court’s contribution-ex-
penditure distinction actually has things backwards. Recall that 
agency costs tend to be especially high when campaign profes-
sionals assist Super PACs and other independent-expenditure 
entities, as opposed to candidates and party committees.302 Dol-
lar for dollar, then, contributions to candidates or parties will 
typically generate more campaign advocacy than funds spent in-
dependently. Thus, to the extent the Court embraces a more-
speech-is-better conception of the First Amendment, it ought to 
be relatively more skeptical of contribution limits that shift 
money away from candidates and parties and toward less ac-
countable groups, and more amenable to limits on independent 
expenditures that seek to direct money back into more account-
able channels. 
Shifting from judicial doctrine to policy, accounting for the 
campaign industry offers a new perspective on campaign finance 
reform. In particular, recognizing the industry’s central and 
sometimes deleterious role in the political process may temper 
enthusiasm for two types of public financing schemes that are 
currently in vogue among campaign finance scholars and reform-
ers—small-donor matches and vouchers. Matching fund pro-
grams use public money to multiply the impact of small private 
campaign contributions.303 Voucher programs give individual 
 
 299. See Hasen, supra note 187, at 201, 216; Sonja R. West, The “Press,” 
Then & Now, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 90 (2016). 
 300. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 424 (1988). 
 301. Cf. Youn, supra note 266, at 155 (criticizing the view that “each dollar 
of political spending is a quantum of presumptively equivalent First Amend-
ment value”). 
 302. See supra Part II.B. 
 303. See, e.g., Michael J. Malbin et al., Small Donors, Big Democracy: New 
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citizens a set sum of public money that they can then allocate to 
their chosen candidates or political groups.304 Both reforms aim 
to expand citizen participation and diminish the relative influ-
ence of wealthy mega-donors.305 In practice, however, they func-
tion in part as a subsidy for the campaign industry. According to 
one tally of money distributed through New York City’s match-
ing program, campaign professionals have been the largest fi-
nancial beneficiaries.306 As a result, matching funds and vouch-
ers may end up reinforcing at least some of the ills associated 
with the campaign industry. Perhaps the reforms still have a 
sufficient upside to make them worthwhile, but it is important 
to be clear-eyed about this unintended side effect. 
More broadly, the campaign industry’s dominance raises 
questions about the value of inducing more small donors to con-
tribute to campaigns.307 Candidates sometimes make it a prior-
ity to attract small donors and boast that their broad funding 
base makes them less beholden to special interests.308 Grass-
roots funding strategies, however, rarely translate into truly 
grassroots campaigns. Small contributions—like big ones—tend 
to end up underwriting the work of campaign professionals, and 
those professionals sometimes reap windfalls from candidates’ 
small-donor fundraising success.309 Senator Bernie Sanders’ 
2016 presidential campaign is a case in point. Sanders raised 
more than $200 million, mostly from small donors, and spent the 
bulk of it on television, radio, and online advertisements, result-
ing in millions of dollars of commissions for his media and digital 
consultants.310 Small donors, moreover, generally have limited 
 
York City’s Matching Funds as a Model for the Nation and States, 11 ELECTION 
L.J. 3, 4–5 (2012); Spencer Overton, Matching Political Contributions, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 1694, 1696 (2012).  
 304. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A 
NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE 142 (2004); HASEN, supra note 235, at 
89–90. 
 305. See, e.g., HASEN, supra note 235, at 89–90. 
 306. See Campaign Expenditures Revealed, 10 CITYLAW 146 (2004) (citing 
N.Y.C. CAMPAIGN FIN. BOARD, CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS: A REPORT BY THE 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE BD., at 25 (Sept. 2004)) (finding that consultants were the 
single largest line item). 
 307. Cf. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, 
and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 105–06 (2004) (advocating broader 
public participation in the funding of campaigns). 
 308. See Yablon, supra note 290, at 219–20. 
 309. See Clifton & Holland, supra note 159 (suggesting that it is “easier to 
run against the establishment and rail about its perfidy than it is to escape the 
habits of its campaign apparatus”). 
 310. See, e.g., id.; Gold & Narayanswamy, supra note 159. 
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incentives and ability to supervise campaign professionals, po-
tentially giving professionals more control (and more opportuni-
ties for mischief) as campaigns become more diffusely funded.311 
Again, the point here is not to condemn efforts to broaden the 
sources of campaign funds, but instead to identify some potential 
tradeoffs and limitations. 
What about other reform options? If accounting for the cam-
paign industry somewhat weakens the case for injecting new 
money from taxpayers or small donors into campaigns, it may 
somewhat strengthen the case for expenditure limits. Reasona-
ble caps on donor and campaigner spending could incentivize 
more efficient campaigning and constrain profligate campaign 
professionals. Of course, expenditure limits are basically non-
starters under existing judicial doctrine, and that is unlikely to 
change any time soon.312 
A potential alternative for reformers might be to redirect at-
tention from public financing toward the creation of a public 
campaign infrastructure. Perhaps candidates could be given air-
time, or access to media production capabilities, or polling data—
assets that might reduce their reliance on paid professionals and 
thus their demand for campaign funds.313 This is a possibility 
that commentators and policymakers have not fully explored. 
Additionally, reformers might consider making the campaign in-
dustry, rather than campaign money, the object of their regula-
tory efforts—an option examined in Part IV. First, however, the 
next Section turns from the campaign industry’s implications for 
campaign finance to the industry’s implications for political par-
ties. 
B. POLITICAL PARTIES 
From the beginning, the story of the campaign industry has 
been bound up with the story of political parties. As recounted in 
Section I.A, the campaign industry emerged partly in response 
to legal changes that weakened traditional party organizations. 
The interplay between parties and the campaign industry con-
tinues to this day, with each influencing the other in an interde-
 
 311. See infra notes 427–29 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 275–77, 285–90 and accompanying text. 
 313. Cf. Jeremy Paul, Campaign Reform for the 21st Century: Putting Mouth 
Where the Money Is, 30 CONN. L. REV. 779, 782 (1998) (suggesting mandatory 
joint appearances for competing candidates). 
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pendent fashion. Acknowledging the campaign industry thus re-
fines existing accounts of the structure and status of modern po-
litical parties and informs ongoing discussions of party reform. 
Because the campaign industry stepped in as the parties 
lost clout, commentators have traditionally cast the relationship 
between them as essentially zero sum and oppositional: declin-
ing parties created an opening for the campaign industry, and, 
over time, the industry’s rise undercut the parties even more.314 
In other words, this classic account envisions the industry thriv-
ing at the parties’ expense, and vice versa. 
In reality, the relationship between the parties and the cam-
paign industry is more nuanced, in large part because parties 
are complex and fluid entities—a point astutely made in recent 
work by Joseph Fishkin and Heather Gerken, Samuel Issa-
charoff, and Richard Pildes, among others.315 Parties encompass 
and strive to accommodate an array of stakeholders through 
multiple organizational mechanisms. Over time, the influence of 
various players and constituent institutions may wax and wane, 
and a party may appear strong by some measures and weak by 
others.316 The campaign industry affects and is affected by these 
internal party dynamics. The industry has not so much sub-
verted the party system; instead, it has played a role in reconsti-
tuting it. 
Taking this idea further, the campaign industry and the two 
major parties have arguably coevolved and coalesced into exten-
sions of one another. As noted earlier, most campaign profession-
als and firms align themselves with the Democrats or Republi-
cans and provide services exclusively for candidates and 
committees associated with that party.317 They, therefore, ap-
pear to reside within what Fishkin and Gerken have called “the 
party writ large”—a phrase used to convey that parties encom-
pass not just formal party organizations, but also a network of 
 
 314. See, e.g., SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 286; Gross-
mann, Going Pro?, supra note 83, at 82; Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 175, at 
444 (“The early literature on the party-consultant nexus contended that the rise 
of political consultants had weakened parties by creating a locus of campaign 
expertise that was independent of formal party structures.” (citing SABATO, PO-
LITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1)). 
 315. See Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 177; Issa-
charoff, supra note 22, at 847; Pildes, supra note 31, at 829–30. 
 316. See Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 177 (identi-
fying key strengths and weaknesses of modern U.S. parties). 
 317. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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unofficial confederates.318 Indeed, outside political consultants 
often have close ties to the official party apparatus. Many once 
worked within it, and even those who did not have incentives to 
connect themselves to party officials who may direct business 
their way.319 Accordingly, professionals and their firms may be 
better understood as participants within party networks rather 
than as outside threats to them.320 They are essentially the par-
ties’ powerful for-profit affiliates. 
The campaign industry’s clout thus helps to explain the pre-
sent-day condition of the parties. Campaign professionals con-
tribute to what others have recognized as the major parties’ en-
during source of strength—namely, their potent political 
brands.321 The parties are more ideologically distinctive than in 
past decades, and each commands the loyalty of a large swath of 
the electorate.322 Campaign professionals serve in part as brand 
managers for the party labels. This characterization may seem 
at odds with the oft-stated observation that campaign profes-
sionals run candidate-centered as opposed to party-centered 
campaigns.323 But it is not. As they work on behalf of individual 
candidates, professionals often seek to win over and mobilize 
partisans by aligning their candidates with the party brand—or 
by attempting to realign the brand to fit their candidates. The 
 
 318. Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 177–78; see also 
Kang, supra note 33, at 595–96 (“The party writ large is a broad, far flung coa-
lition of political actors that includes not only the formal party committees, of-
ficeholders, and candidates, but high-level party donors, party-allied interest 
groups, intellectual leaders and pundits, and even grassroots volunteers and 
sympathetic voters.”). 
 319. Thurber, Portrait, supra note 199, at 13 (“[T]he most common past ex-
perience or training cited by professional consultants was working for a na-
tional, state, or local party or party committee.”); see also Kolodny & Logan, 
supra note 130, at 156; Martin & Peskowitz, supra note 175, at 445. For more 
on the structure and function of modern party organizations, see Andrias, Hol-
lowed-Out Democracy, supra note 186, at 48–51 (describing the national party 
committees as “function[ing] primarily as campaign service vendors”). 
 320. Kolodny & Logan, supra note 130, at 155–56 (contending that “the al-
lied view” of consultant-party relationships depicts reality better than “the ad-
versarial view”). 
 321. See, e.g., Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 187 (“[A] 
party today is best understood as a loose coalition of diverse entities . . . orga-
nized around a popular national brand.”). 
 322. Id. at 183–84. 
 323. See, e.g., SHEINGATE, supra note 1, at 6–8 (contrasting party agents, 
who were hired by party leaders, with political consultants who work for indi-
vidual candidates); Pildes, supra note 31, at 835 (referring to the “candidate-
centered nature” of campaign systems). 
  
206 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:151 
 
brand serves as a sought-after prize.324 Consider recent intra-
party contests that have been portrayed as battles for each 
party’s soul.325 Moreover, in addition to their candidate work, 
some professionals take on explicit brand-building assignments 
on behalf of official party organizations.326 
The campaign industry’s branding success enables the par-
ties to carry on despite their organizational weakness. Others 
have rightly described the modern Democratic and Republican 
parties as “hollowed-out,” meaning that they are no longer 
meaningful sites of democratic engagement and contestation 
among ordinary citizens and activists.327 State and local party 
 
 324. See, e.g., Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 211 
(asserting that “party brands . . . are up for grabs in each election cycle, as dif-
ferent entities attempt to capture the party writ large”); Issacharoff, supra note 
22, at 847 (discussing candidates’ efforts during the 2016 presidential election 
to capture their parties’ brands). 
 325. See, e.g., Molly Ball, Who’s Winning the Democrats’ Civil War?, TIME 
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Battle Over What the Democratic Party Stands for, WASH. POST: POWERPOST 
(Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/in-governors-races 
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crats’ campaign strategies and platforms). 
 326. See Sean A. Cain, Political Consultants and Party-Centered Campaign-
ing: Evidence from the 2010 U.S. House Primary Election Campaigns, 12 ELEC-
TION L.J. 3, 4–5 (2013) (distinguishing consultants working explicitly with par-
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entities have become especially marginalized.328 Rather than re-
lying on the party’s internal machinery, the campaign industry 
has channeled campaign activity through the mass media and, 
as necessary, developed more campaign-specific grassroots net-
works.329 
By making it possible for the parties to retain their electoral 
salience without vesting significant responsibility in rank-and-
file activists and party officials, the campaign industry has facil-
itated a power transfer within parties toward the elites at the 
top.330 Until recently, national party leaders were the beneficiar-
ies of this shift. Today, however, the campaign industry is facil-
itating a power transfer to a new breed of elites—ones who exert 
influence primarily outside the parties’ formal structures.331 In 
particular, wealthy funders are enlisting campaign professionals 
to establish and operate Super PACs and other entities that aim 
to influence the official party apparatus and shape party 
brands.332 The campaign industry is, practically speaking, what 
enables these new power centers to function.333 Sometimes 
dubbed “shadow parties,”334 such entities do not merely increase 
the sway of the plutocrats who provide the financing. They also 
aggrandize campaign professionals, since, as noted earlier, pro-
fessionals often have significant leeway to direct these campaign 
vehicles in the manner of their choosing.335 
 
 328. See Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 176 (“State 
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What does all this mean for party reform? Commentators 
have been debating proposals to reinvigorate official party struc-
tures, including by lifting caps on contributions to party organi-
zations and allowing them to receive unlimited funds.336 Such 
deregulation of party financing seems unlikely to work a sea 
change because it would do little to change the incentives of the 
campaign industry. Campaign professionals would presumably 
continue to encourage the wealthy to support independent 
groups because such groups give their funders—and, not coinci-
dentally, professionals themselves—maximum flexibility to pur-
sue particular political objectives.337 To the extent that donors 
do direct more funds to official party organizations, the parties 
are likely to end up hiring the same professionals. Official party 
organizations may subject those professionals to somewhat 
closer supervision than independent groups, but because cam-
paign consultants will be answering to national party elites, 
their work will almost certainly remain brand-oriented. They are 
unlikely to be tasked with revitalizing the parties from the bot-
tom up.338 
Loosening the grip of campaign professionals and their pa-
trons on the parties is likely to require reforms that aim to re-
build party infrastructures from their local and state founda-
tions and to bolster the in-house capacities of the parties to do 
their own campaigning. Some potential reforms along these lines 
may involve tradeoffs not worth making. For example, whatever 
the faults of our industry-dominated politics, it is far from clear 
that we would be better off returning to patronage and the spoils 
system.339 Instead, directing funds toward community-level 
party actors and reforming party rules to give those actors 
greater voice and responsibility may offer a more palatable path. 
 
 336. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 33, at 531 (discussing and critiquing such 
deregulation proposals). 
 337. Cf. Fishkin & Gerken, The Party’s Over, supra note 22, at 197 (identi-
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personnel and strategy). 
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of the campaign finance system toward the interests of the very wealthy.”).  
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IV.  CONTEMPLATING REFORM   
As the discussion in Part III indicates, campaign finance 
regulation and political party reform offer two potential mecha-
nisms for checking the campaign industry. Such interventions 
could seek to stem the flow of funds that sustain the industry 
and establish alternative outlets for campaign activity. Another 
strategy is to pursue industry reform head-on. The campaign in-
dustry has long operated with strikingly little direct public or 
private oversight,340 although that may be beginning to change. 
In recent years, a smattering of state and local governments 
have begun regulating campaign professionals, or at least con-
sidered doing so—perhaps evincing a nascent trend. Still, com-
pared to lobbyists, lawyers, and many other professional service 
providers, campaign professionals remain lightly superintended. 
This Part does not develop detailed policy proposals nor ad-
vocate for a particular prescriptive path. Rather, it explores 
three categories of interventions that governmental and nongov-
ernmental actors might pursue: first, substantive regulations on 
industry practices; second, regulations to promote transparency; 
and third, private ordering mechanisms. For each category, it 
identifies a range of possible correctives and offers preliminary 
reflections on attendant legal and practical issues.  
Several considerations are likely to inform one’s views about 
the need for and value of particular interventions. Among other 
things, observers may disagree about the severity and relative 
importance of the campaign industry’s pathologies. They may 
have divergent visions of the campaign industry’s proper role rel-
ative to other institutional actors, including party organizations 
and the media. They also may make different judgments about 
the constitutionality or political viability of various actions. This 
Article seeks to generate discussion of these matters, not settle 
the debate. 
Before proceeding to specifics, one overarching word of cau-
tion: interventions in this area may well entail tradeoffs. 
Measures to protect candidates and donors from unscrupulous 
 
 340. See De Vries, supra note 85, at 23 (noting that campaign consultants 
are not “licensed, regulated, or made in any way to conform to standards of con-
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professionals might address some real concerns about the cam-
paign industry’s conduct, but they also might improve the effi-
ciency of campaign entities like Super PACs and thus help 
wealthy interests advance their electoral and policy goals. Con-
versely, some efforts to address the industry’s systemic conse-
quences could make campaign professionals less valuable to 
their clients. For example, barring candidates from paying vic-
tory bonuses to campaign staff and consultants might reduce 
professionals’ incentives to fight dirty, but it also might diminish 
their will to win.341 This does not mean that reform is necessarily 
a zero-sum endeavor. Reformers may well conclude that the ben-
efits achieved on one front outweigh the costs imposed on an-
other, and some measures may simultaneously produce improve-
ments along multiple dimensions. 
A. SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION 
Perhaps the most obvious way to try to address ills associ-
ated with the campaign industry is by imposing regulatory con-
straints on the conduct of campaign professionals. This could in-
clude limitations on professionals’ offerings, rates, or clients. For 
the most part, the campaign industry has not faced such direct 
regulation at any level—federal, state, or local.342 But this is not 
entirely uncharted territory. As discussed below, a few past and 
present attempts at campaign industry regulation, as well as 
regulatory activity in analogous areas, such as lobbying, offer 
guidance about the types of measures that might be pursued. 
Of course, this is an area in which the First Amendment 
casts a long shadow. The relationships between campaigners 
and campaign professionals involve core political association, 
and campaigners hire professionals in part to facilitate cam-
paign discourse—that is, core political speech.343 As a result, reg-
ulations that would outright prohibit campaign professionals 
from serving campaigns are probably constitutional nonstarters. 
They would simply intrude too deeply on protected electoral ad-
vocacy. Direct regulation is more likely to be a tool to curb some 
 
 341. Cf. SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 304 (suggesting 
that political consultants’ desire for both victory and profit encourages a “win-
at-all-costs philosophy”). 
 342. See supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
 343. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 (1976) (per curiam) (“[L]egislative 
restrictions on advocacy of the election or defeat of political candidates are 
wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.”). 
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of the industry’s excesses rather than to displace the industry 
entirely. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer v. Grant is instruc-
tive.344 At issue in Meyer was a Colorado law that barred anyone 
trying to get an initiative on the ballot from paying petition cir-
culators to gather the necessary signatures.345 In other words, 
the law sidelined professionals and left a particular type of cam-
paign-related activity exclusively in the hands of uncompensated 
volunteers.346 The Court unanimously invalidated the law.347 
The First Amendment, the Court declared, guarantees initiative 
proponents the right “not only to advocate their cause but also to 
select what they believe to be the most effective means for so 
doing”—namely, hiring petition circulators.348 Applying strict 
scrutiny, the Court held that the state’s asserted interests in en-
suring that initiatives had grassroots support and in protecting 
the integrity of the initiative process did not suffice to justify the 
law.349 Other cases have similarly decried governmental inter-
ference with campaigning.350 
 
 344. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 345. Id. at 417. 
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Although the First Amendment may preclude measures to 
put campaign professionals out of business, at least some consti-
tutional space likely remains for more modest regulations on in-
dustry practice. Notably, some longstanding campaign finance 
rules already constrain campaign professionals in various re-
spects. Federal law, for instance, bars professionals—and any-
one else—from converting contributions to a candidate commit-
tee to personal use.351 Officers and employees of political 
committees also may not knowingly accept contributions in ex-
cess of the legal limits applicable to their organizations,352 or im-
properly coordinate the activities of a campaign committee and 
an independently financed group.353 Indeed, federal anti-coordi-
nation rules expressly consider whether a candidate and an out-
side group share a “commercial vendor.”354  
Given that campaigners turn to professionals in part to help 
navigate election-related laws, one potential regulatory reform 
is simply to place additional responsibility for compliance on pro-
fessionals. For example, reforms might broaden the circum-
stances in which liability for campaign finance violations and 
other malfeasance attaches not merely to campaign committees, 
 
 351. See 52 U.S.C. § 30114(b) (2016) (“A contribution or donation . . . shall 
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or consultants providing services for the person paying for the communication 
and those employees or consultants currently or previously providing services 
to the candidate.” Id.; cf. Shays v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 528 F.3d 914, 929–30 
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (rejecting an administrative law challenge to the validity of the 
firewall regulation). 
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but to professionals themselves.355 This could help align the in-
centives of professionals and their clients and encourage cam-
paigns to heed existing law. Separately, Congress could take the 
straightforward step of broadening the ban on converting cam-
paign funds to personal use. It currently applies only to candi-
date committees and does not cover misappropriations of funds 
donated to party committees, PACs, and other entities.356 This is 
a change that the Federal Election Commission has specifically 
recommended.357 
Somewhat more ambitiously, reformers could pursue regu-
lation to minimize potential conflicts of interest or influence ped-
dling.358 In the world of lobbying, jurisdictions commonly impose 
anti-revolving door rules that require former government offi-
cials to wait a certain period of time before they may begin to 
lobby.359 Analogous waiting periods could be established for cam-
paign professionals. A few already exist at the local level. Since 
2004, for example, San Francisco, California has required cam-
paign professionals to wait five years before lobbying municipal 
officials who have been their clients.360 Miami Beach, Florida re-
cently adopted a measure precluding campaign professionals 
from lobbying local officials for one year after working on a mu-
nicipal election campaign.361 Similar measures have been con-
sidered but not enacted in New York State, Seattle, Washington, 
 
 355. Cf. Sean J. Miller, More Scrutiny on Fundraisers? Some Practitioners 
Say It’s About Time, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (June 21, 2017), https://www 
.campaignsandelections.com/campaign-insider/more-scrutiny-on-fundraisers 
-some-practitioners-say-it-s-about-time (discussing the desire for increased fed-
eral scrutiny of scam PACs and bad actors in political fundraising).  
 356. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION 10 (2017), https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms 
-content/documents/legrec2017.pdf (“Congress should amend the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act’s prohibition of the personal use of campaign funds to extend 
its reach to all political committees.”). 
 357. Id. 
 358. See SABATO, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 1, at 310 (“Political 
consultant firms simply should not handle the accounts of groups that are lob-
bying officials the consultants have helped elect.”). 
 359. See Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 191, 207 (2012) (surveying state anti-revolving door provisions). 
But cf. David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 507, 511, 546 (2013) (critiquing anti-revolving door regulations and high-
lighting benefits of the revolving door phenomenon). 
 360. S.F. Campaign & Governmental Conduct Code § 2.117 (2018). 
 361. Joey Flechas, Miami Beach Bans Lobbying by Political Consultants for 
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and Portland, Oregon.362 One practical difficulty with such re-
volving-door measures is that campaign professionals, like for-
mer government officials, may find ways to exert influence that 
do not fall within the definition of lobbying.363 At a minimum, 
jurisdictions could restrict individuals from serving simultane-
ously as a government official or staffer and as a paid political 
consultant. At the federal level, House and Senate ethics rules 
constrain this practice,364 but states and localities often fail to 
address it.365 
Along similar lines, reformers could seek to slow the revolv-
ing door between campaign committees and outside consulting 
firms, or at least preclude individuals from holding an in-house 
campaign role while simultaneously maintaining a stake in an 
outside firm that does business with the campaign. In this re-
gard, the Federal Election Commission recently encouraged 
Congress to “consider adding standards addressing payments to 
 
 362. The New York measure was first introduced in the state legislature in 
2013 and most recently reintroduced in 2017. See S. 1449, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2017), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2017/s1449/amendment/ 
original#; Ken Lovett, ‘Firewall’ Bill vs. Lobbyists: Campaign Consultants 
Would No Longer Be Allowed to Turn Around and Lobby Those They Help Elect, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 6, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ 
firewall-bill-lobbyists-campaign-consultants-no-longer-allowed-turn-lobby 
-elect-article-1.1335975 (describing newly introduced bill and its would-be im-
pact on consultants and lobbyists). Regarding Seattle and Portland, see Jim 
Brunner, Seattle Mayoral Aide Sees Conflict of Interest in Lobbying by Political 
Consultants, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-news/politics/seattle-mayoral-aide-sees-conflict-of-interest-in-lobbying 
-by-political-consultants; Brad Schmidt, Portland Weighing Rules on Lobbying 
by Political Consultants, OREGONIAN (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.oregonlive 
.com/portland/index.ssf/2015/09/portland_weighing_rules_on_lob.html. 
 363. Cf. Hasen, supra note 359, at 247–48 (observing that former officials 
structure their activities to avoid lobbying registration requirements); Janine 
R. Wedel, Rethinking Corruption in an Age of Ambiguity, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 453, 483 (2012) (discussing “shadow lobbyists” who “evade the legal re-
quirements, such as registration, of the venues in which they operate”). 
 364. See H. COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 110TH CONG., HOUSE ETHICS MANUAL 218 (2008) (prohibiting 
receipt of compensation for various consulting activities); S. SELECT COMM. ON 
ETHICS, U.S. SENATE, 108TH CONG., SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 71–74, 95–
96 (2003) (providing examples of permissible and impermissible political activ-
ity). 
 365. Missouri recently banned state legislators from serving as paid political 
consultants. H.B. 1983, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016). A bill to 
extend the ban to legislative staff was recently introduced but has not passed. 
See Marshall Griffin & Jason Rosenbaum, Ethics and Appointments Highlight 
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vendors with financial relationships with the individuals who es-
tablish or operate political committees.”366 Lawmakers could 
also impose waiting periods or other constraints on corporate or 
international work (whether for foreign governments or on for-
eign campaigns). And to the extent they have concerns about 
campaign firms merging into global public relations or advertis-
ing conglomerates,367 they could seek to limit such restructuring. 
Measures such as these may help to minimize potential conflicts 
of interest without unduly hampering the campaign industry’s 
ability to operate. Rules addressing conflicts of interest in other 
contexts, such as lobbying, government employment and con-
tracting, securities, or corporate governance, could offer guid-
ance.368 
Taking a slightly different tack, jurisdictions could place the 
onus for avoiding improprieties on officeholders rather than 
campaign professionals. Specifically, officeholders could be re-
quired to recuse themselves from matters in which their cam-
paign consultants have a direct stake or lobbying role. San Jose, 
California has a rule along these lines. City council members 
must abstain when someone who acted as their campaign con-
sultant within the twelve months before their election is a party, 
or represents a party, on a matter that comes before them.369 
There may be constitutional limits, however, on how far recusal 
rules can extend. Justice Kennedy has suggested that barring an 
official “from voting on matters advanced by or associated with 
a political supporter” raises First Amendment concerns.370 
 
 366. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 356, at 7. 
 367. See supra notes 147–49 and accompanying text (describing the size and 
scope of political advertising conglomerates). 
 368. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207, 208 (2016) (addressing conflicts of in-
terest and self-dealing by federal officials); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§ 501–02, 92 Stat. 1824 (disqualifying former government 
employees and public officials from certain activities due to conflicts of interest); 
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 305.028 (2016) (delineating prohibited conflicts of interest 
for registered lobbyists and describing procedures for giving notice of conflicts 
and obtaining client consent); see also Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Compro-
mised Fiduciaries: Conflicts of Interest in Government and Business, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 1637, 1650–78 (2011) (surveying conflict of interest laws governing the 
corporate sector); Jonathan Macey, The Nature of Conflicts of Interest Within 
the Firm, 31 J. CORP. L. 613, 613 (2006) (highlighting the ubiquity of conflicts 
of interest in business and the need for correctives). 
 369. SAN JOSE, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 12.22.210, 12.22.220, 12.22.300 
(2000). 
 370. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 131 (2011) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). Carrigan involved a city council member who voted on a devel-
opment project for which his campaign manager was a paid consultant and was 
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Additionally, reformers could attempt to curb industry 
abuses by regulating the rates and fees campaign professionals 
charge. Regulation could, for instance, cap or eliminate commis-
sion-based compensation arrangements in an effort to discour-
age professionals from overemphasizing those campaign activi-
ties that are most easily monetized. Similarly, reformers could 
consider whether to limit the use of incentives such as victory 
bonuses. While compensating professionals based in part on 
their clients’ electoral success may usefully help align incentives, 
it can also tempt professionals to engage in unscrupulous con-
duct to improve their clients’ prospects. Again, regulatory 
schemes that apply to other professionals, such as lobbyists and 
lawyers, could serve as models. Most states, for instance, bar lob-
byists from receiving fees contingent on the passage of favorable 
legislation.371 Moreover, some jurisdictions already regulate one 
narrow category of election-related compensation—namely, fees 
associated with signature gathering for ballot access. These ju-
risdictions restrict paying petition circulators based on the num-
ber of signatures they obtain out of concern that per-signature 
payments encourage fraud.372 Such regulations are narrower 
 
then censured by the Nevada Commission on Ethics for violating the state’s 
general recusal law. Id. at 119–21. The Court rejected Carrigan’s contention 
that he had a First Amendment right to cast the vote, but declined to consider 
whether the Commission’s application of its recusal rule unlawfully burdened 
the associational rights of Carrigan and his supporters because the argument 
was not properly before it. Id. at 128–29.  
 371. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 359, at 207 (reporting that fourty-three 
states ban contingent-fee lobbying). Courts have upheld such contingency-fee 
restrictions. See Fla. League of Prof ’ l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs, 87 F.3d 457, 457 
(11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the First Amendment allows state prohibitions on 
contingency fees); see also Meredith A. Capps, Note, “Gouging the Government”: 
Why a Federal Contingency Fee Lobbying Prohibition Is Consistent with First 
Amendment Freedoms, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1885, 1891 (2005) (“Bans on contin-
gency fee lobbying contracts . . . have generally withstood constitutional chal-
lenge in the courts.”). Some commentators, however, have questioned their con-
stitutionality. See Stacie L. Fatka & Jason Miles Levien, Note, Protecting the 
Right to Petition: Why a Lobbying Contingency Fee Prohibition Violates the Con-
stitution, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 559 (1998) (“[A] ban on contingency fee agree-
ments unduly burdens one’s First Amendment right to petition the govern-
ment.”). 
 372. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1b (“It shall be unlawful to pay or receive 
money . . . based on the number of signatures obtained on [a] . . . petition.”); 
N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 17-122(4) (2017) (prohibiting payment on a per-signature ba-
sis). A few states have limited additional rate regulation. Utah prohibits any 
person who receives expenditures from a candidate or campaign committee to 
charge rates that “exceed the charges made for comparable use to any other 
person considering the amount of use, frequency of use, and applicable dis-
counts.” UTAH CODE § 20A-11-903 (2012). While the provision has been in place 
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than the categorical ban on paid circulators that the Supreme 
Court invalidated in Meyer.373 
To be clear, the extent to which the First Amendment limits 
regulations of the sort described above remains an open ques-
tion. The record in related contexts is mixed. Existing revolving-
door rules for lobbyists, for example, have encountered limited 
resistance,374 although some observers have expressed concern 
that the Supreme Court’s recent deregulatory orientation in 
campaign finance cases could call such regulations into ques-
tion.375 Per-signature fee regulations have withstood constitu-
tional challenge in three federal appellate courts,376 but they 
have been invalidated in a fourth and in several federal district 
courts.377 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court on several occasions 
has invalidated restrictions on charitable fundraising practices, 
articulating a fairly broad conception of the First Amendment 
rights at stake.378 Those rulings could be invoked to challenge 
 
since 1995, it has never been invoked in reported litigation. New Jersey prohib-
its campaigns from paying workers in cash, perhaps in an effort to hinder vote-
buying schemes. See Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act, 
N.J. STAT. § 1944A-11.7 (1993) (requiring payment by check). 
 373. See 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988) (striking down general prohibition on 
paying petition circulators). 
 374. See, e.g., United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1115–16 (7th Cir. 
1973) (rejecting challenges to a revolving door law); Richard Briffault, The Anx-
iety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13 ELECTION L.J. 160 
(2014) (discussing revolving door regulation as one technique to regulate lobby-
ing); Joseph P. Tomain, Gridlock, Lobbying, and Democracy, 7 WAKE FOREST J. 
L. & POL’Y 87, 134 (2017) (observing that revolving door restrictions are “gener-
ally considered legitimate”). 
 375. See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 371, at 19. But cf. Maggie McKinley, Lob-
bying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1194 (2016) (cautioning 
against conflating constitutional analysis of lobbying regulation and election 
regulation). In 2010, a federal district court invalidated an Ohio revolving door 
law, but that case may be aberrational, in part because the state conceded that 
the law was subject to strict scrutiny. See Brinkman v. Budish, 692 F. Supp. 3d 
855, 861 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (noting Defendant’s strict scrutiny concession); 
McKinley, supra, at 1195 (describing Brinkman as “an outlier case”). 
 376. See Person v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 467 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2006); Initiative & Referendum Inst. 
v. Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2001). At least one state high court has also 
upheld such a rule. See Busefink v. State, 286 P.3d 599 (Nev. 2012). 
 377. See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008); 
Ind. Inst. v. Gessler, 936 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1259 (D. Colo. 2013); On Our Terms 
‘97 PAC v. Sec’y of State of Me., 101 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D. Me. 1999); Limit v. 
Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
 378. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 784, 792 
(1988) (invalidating a state law that barred professional fundraisers from charg-
ing “unreasonable” or “excessive” fees for soliciting charitable contributions and 
describing “the State’s generalized interest in unilaterally imposing its notions 
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regulatory constraints on campaign professionals’ financial ar-
rangements with their clients. 
Ultimately, proponents of industry regulation will need to 
convince courts that the measures they are defending do not bur-
den speech or association so significantly as to trigger exacting 
scrutiny of the sort applied in Meyer and in recent campaign fi-
nance cases. They also will need to identify and defend the gov-
ernmental interests that the measures are advancing. In this re-
gard, they will presumably lean on cases that recognize the 
government’s vital interests in ensuring the integrity of electoral 
and governmental processes.379 They could additionally contend 
that certain regulations actually facilitate speech and associa-
tion rather than inhibit it by encouraging professionals to advo-
cate for their clients more effectively and to spend funds on com-
munication rather than on self-enrichment. Much will depend on 
whether courts are willing to credit these regulatory rationales 
 
of fairness on the fundraising contract” as “constitutionally invalid”); Sec’y of 
State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 950 (1984) (invalidating a 
state statute that presumptively precluded fundraisers from retaining more 
than twenty-five percent of the money they collected for charity); Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980) (invalidat-
ing a local ordinance that prohibited charitable organizations from soliciting 
contributions unless at least three quarters of funds obtained were used for 
“charitable purposes”). These cases do “leave a corridor open for fraud actions 
to guard the public against false or misleading charitable solicitations.” Ill. ex 
rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 617 (2003). 
 379. See, e.g., John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198 (2010) (explaining 
that “the State’s interest in preserving electoral integrity is not limited to com-
bating fraud,” but “extends more generally to promoting transparency and ac-
countability in the electoral process, which the State argues is ‘essential to the 
proper functioning of a democracy’”); Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 197 (2008) (recognizing the government’s interest in protecting “public 
confidence in the integrity of the electoral process,” which “encourages citizen 
participation in the democratic process”); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 
(2006) (“‘A State indisputably has a compelling interest in preserving the integ-
rity of its election process.’ Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes 
is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.” (quoting Eu v. 
S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231, (1989))); Storer v. Brown, 
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (observing that “there must be a substantial regulation 
of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather 
than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n 
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973) (noting, in the context 
of upholding restrictions on political activities of public employees, the govern-
ment’s interest in maintaining “fair and effective government” and in “the im-
partial execution of the laws”); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625–26 
(1954) (noting, in the context of upholding lobbying disclosure regulations, that 
Congress acted “to maintain the integrity of a basic governmental process”—“a 
vital national interest”). 
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or whether they instead cast the government’s regulatory inter-
ests in narrower terms, as they have in the campaign finance 
context.380 
B. TRANSPARENCY-ORIENTED REGULATION 
Regulatory reforms that aim to make the campaign industry 
more transparent could serve as an alternative or complement 
to direct regulation. As previously discussed, the industry’s op-
erations are presently quite opaque, creating ripe conditions for 
misdeeds that clients and the broader public may not readily de-
tect.381 One potential response would be to revamp existing cam-
paign finance or lobbying disclosure regimes to reveal more 
about the industry’s activities. Another would be to craft a dis-
closure regime specific to campaign professionals. Again, a smat-
tering of regulations along these lines is already on the books at 
the state and local levels. Those measures, described below, may 
offer models or lessons for reformers. 
In terms of modifying the existing campaign finance disclo-
sure regime, a few modest changes could shed real light on the 
campaign industry’s activities. For instance, campaign commit-
tees could be required to disclose not just payments made di-
rectly to their primary vendors but also all payments that those 
vendors make to subvendors on the campaign’s behalf. Massa-
chusetts requires such subvendor disclosure,382 and Texas re-
cently enacted a similar rule.383 Campaign committees also could 
be required to identify their service providers’ parent companies 
or affiliates. 
Meanwhile, lobbying disclosure rules might be amended to 
identify instances in which campaign professionals attempt to 
sway clients or former clients on policy matters.384 Existing re-
 
 380. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 
(2014) (“This Court has identified only one legitimate governmental interest for 
restricting campaign finances: preventing corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption. . . . Moreover, . . . Congress may target only a specific type of corrup-
tion—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”). 
 381. See supra Part I.B. 
 382. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 55 § 18D (2018). 
 383. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Rule §§ 20.56, 20.61(b) (2017), https://www.ethics 
.state.tx.us/rules/adopted_Sep_2017.html; see also Ross Ramsey, Texas Ethics 
Commission Chases “Campaign in a Box Spending,” TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2016), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2016/08/15/texas-ethics-commission-chases 
-campaign-box-spendi. 
 384. For in-depth discussion of lobbying regulation, see, for example, Hasen, 
supra note 359; Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and 
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gimes often require lobbyists to reveal certain campaign contri-
butions or campaign fundraising activities.385 Lobbyists might 
likewise be directed to disclose any campaign services they pro-
vide, at least to officials whom they later lobby. Nevada is among 
the few jurisdictions that currently impose a requirement along 
these lines.386 New York City similarly requires lobbyists to dis-
close whether they have engaged in “political consulting activi-
ties,” and to specify “the candidate, public servant, or elected of-
ficial to whom or on whose behalf”  they performed those 
activities.387 
Somewhat more ambitiously, jurisdictions could develop 
transparency rules specific to campaign professionals.388 A hand-
ful of these systems already exist. San Francisco has the most 
extensive and deeply-rooted regime.389 It requires campaign pro-
fessionals to register with the city and publicly disclose an array 
of information, including the identity of their employees and cli-
ents, the amount of money they receive from clients, certain po-
litical contributions they make or facilitate, gifts they make to 
officeholders, economic consideration they receive from vendors 
and subvendors, and any city contracts they obtain.390 The city’s 
Ethics Commission oversees the system and shares the filings, 
as well as data analysis, on its website.391 The disclosures for 
2016 revealed that registrants received nearly five million dol-
lars in payments for their work on behalf of local candidates and 
ballot proposition campaigns.392 Although the system has been 
 
Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006); William V. Luneburg, 
The Evolution of Federal Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now and Where 
We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85 (2009). 
 385. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (2012). 
 386. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 218H.210(4) (2018) (requiring registered lobby-
ists to identify “any current Legislator for whom” the registrant “has, in connec-
tion with a political campaign of the Legislator, provided consulting, advertising 
or other professional services since the beginning of the preceding regular ses-
sion”). 
 387. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-216.1 (2017). 
 388. See MEDVIC, POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, supra note 188, at 155 (suggest-
ing that “consultants could be required to register with the Federal Election 
Commission and to report earnings from political work to the FEC”). 
 389. See S.F., CAL., CAMPAIGN AND GOVERNMENTAL CONDUCT CODE ch. 5, 
§§ 1.500–545 (2010). 
 390. Id. § 1.515. 
 391. See Campaign Consultant Disclosure, S.F. ETHICS COMM’N, https:// 
sfethics.org/disclosures/campaign-consultant-disclosure (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018). 
 392. This total—specifically, $4,934,418.98—derives from a spreadsheet of 
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in place for more than two decades (the city’s voters established 
it by ballot initiative in 1997),393 it has received virtually no 
scholarly attention.  
Notably, New York recently enacted the first state-level 
campaign industry disclosure regime. New York’s law, adopted 
in 2016 with little public fanfare, is more limited than San Fran-
cisco’s scheme. It focuses on campaign professionals who also en-
gage in policy advocacy.394 Administered by the Department of 
State’s Division of Licensing Services, the law requires political 
consultants who have served elected officials or candidates in the 
State to register and file disclosures every six months if they 
have also represented clients with business before state or local 
government bodies or officials.395 Registrants must identify the 
officials and candidates for whom they worked, their clients with 
government business, and the nature of the services they pro-
vided to each.396 The law does not call for financial disclosures. 
Although implementation is at an early stage, several dozen con-
sultants have registered.397 Portland, Oregon recently adopted a 
somewhat similar measure. It requires political professionals 
who offer services to elected city officials to register with the city 
auditor and identify their clients. Registrants, however, need not 
disclose financial arrangements or other details of their work.398 
 
data compiled by the Ethics Commission. Campaign Consultants – Client Pay-
ment Report, DataSF, https://data.sfgov.org/City-Management-and-Ethics/ 
Campaign-Consultants-Client-Payment-Report/be6w-p8an/data (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2018). The annual totals vary depending on the number and competi-
tiveness of the local races. For 2015, registrants reported $6,297,794.00 in re-
ceipts; for 2014, which featured a contentious and expensive ballot proposition 
campaign, the total was $11,510,877.00. See id.; see also Heather Knight, Soda 
Industry Spends $7.7 Million to Defeat SF Sugar Tax – So Far, S.F. CHRON. 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Soda-industry-spends-7 
-7-million-to-defeat-SF-5807057.php. 
 393. See DEP’T OF ELECTIONS, CITY & CTY. OF S.F., CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 
FRANCISCO VOTER INFORMATION PAMPHLET AND SAMPLE BALLOT, CONSOLI-
DATED MUNICIPAL ELECTION, 1997, 73–82 (1997) (describing the ballot meas-
ure). 
 394. See N.Y. Dep’t St. Division Licensing Services, Political Consultant Dis-
closure Statement, https://www.dos.ny.gov/licensing/politicalconsultant.html 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 395. N.Y. Exec. Law 6 § 109 (2016); 19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 153 (2017), https://www 
.dos.ny.gov/licensing/pdfs/PoliticalConsultant.pdf (implementing regulations). 
 396. 19 N.Y.C.R.R. § 153.3 (2017). 
 397. See Political Consultant Filings: Beginning 2016, N.Y ST., https://data 
.ny.gov/Transparency/Political-Consultant-Filings-Beginning-2016/tekz-xrvb 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
 398. PORTLAND, OR., CODE ch. 2.14 (“Reporting by Political Consultants”); 
see also Brad Schmidt, Political Consultants Must Disclose Clients Under New 
  
222 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:151 
 
As a constitutional matter, transparency rules may fare bet-
ter on the whole than substantive restrictions on campaign in-
dustry practice, although they will no doubt face objections. One 
prominent consulting firm in New York publicly declared its in-
tention to flout that state’s disclosure law, asserting that the 
State is not entitled “to monitor routine political activities and 
associations.”399 The Supreme Court, however, has been rela-
tively tolerant of campaign finance disclosure laws,400 and it long 
ago upheld disclosure requirements for lobbyists as well.401 Alt-
hough disclosure rules can no doubt become overly onerous or 
intrusive,402 or can be drafted too vaguely,403 it seems likely that 
jurisdictions can lawfully require some form of meaningful cam-
paign industry disclosure. That said, the practical difficulty of 
enacting such regulations and the risk of legal challenge make it 
important to consider whether and how the private sector might 
also help to achieve campaign industry reform—a subject to 
which the next Section turns. 
C. PRIVATE ORDERING 
As I have argued elsewhere, private interventions are an un-
derappreciated option for achieving political reform.404 Private 
 
Portland Rule, OREGONIAN (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.oregonlive.com/ 
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action has the virtue of sidestepping both political and constitu-
tional hurdles to government regulation.405 Private efforts to im-
prove the campaign industry’s conduct might come from at least 
two distinct sources. First, campaign professionals could them-
selves develop a system of industry self-regulation. Second, cam-
paign funders could pursue measures to constrain and monitor 
professionals. 
The campaign industry currently has only rudimentary self-
regulatory mechanisms. Campaign professionals have not estab-
lished a framework of private accreditation or oversight.406 Since 
1969, they have had a national professional organization, the 
American Association of Political Consultants (AAPC),407 but the 
group has been more of a cheerleader for the industry than a 
standard-setter or disciplinarian. Membership is optional, and 
professionals need not possess any particular experience or cre-
dentials to join, nor do they need to satisfy any continuing edu-
cation or other requirements to stay.408 The AAPC does require 
members to sign a Code of Professional Ethics,409 but the Code 
is vague and superficial. The Code directs signatories to “treat 
. . . colleagues and clients with respect,” to “respect the confi-
dence of . . . clients and not reveal confidential or privileged in-
formation,” and to use client funds “only for those purposes in-
voiced in writing.”410 It says nothing, however, about conflicts of 
interest, self-dealing, duties of care, and the like.411 The Code 
also includes several precepts related to campaign communica-
tions. It instructs professionals to avoid appeals “based on rac-
ism, sexism, religious intolerance or any form of unlawful dis-
crimination”; to “refrain from false or misleading attacks on an 
opponent”; to “document accurately and fully any criticism of an 
opponent”; and to be “honest . . . with the news media.”412 While 
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these sentiments are admirable, the provisions are at most hor-
tatory and appear to be routinely flouted.413 The Code lacks any 
associated protocols for securing compliance, identifying viola-
tions, or punishing violators.414 
The AAPC or a new organization could adopt substantive 
membership criteria and strengthen its code of conduct, borrow-
ing ideas from other fields.415 Lawyers, of course, have highly 
developed self-regulatory regimes, including detailed rules of 
professional responsibility.416 Those rules, particularly as they 
pertain to lawyers’ duties to their clients, may be instructive 
even if the campaign industry remains far less formalized than 
the legal profession.417 Self-regulatory practices among profes-
sional lobbyists may similarly offer guidance. State-level lobby-
ist associations often have ethics codes more detailed than the 
AAPC’s, and they sometimes specify procedures for filing com-
plaints, investigating alleged misconduct, and imposing penal-
ties.418 Especially for the fundraising-related services that cam-
paign professionals provide, the Code of Ethical Standards for 
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the Association of Fundraising Professionals might also serve as 
a model.419 Among other things, the Code—which is backed by a 
formal enforcement process420—precludes members from accept-
ing contingency fees and commissions.421 
Campaign professionals may well be amenable to at least 
some self-regulatory measures. Political science research sug-
gests that professionals have developed some informal ethical 
norms, especially with regard to their relationships with cli-
ents.422 According to one study, overwhelming majorities of po-
litical consultants view it as unprofessional to conceal conflicts 
of interests, take undisclosed kickbacks, prioritize their financial 
interests over client interests, and more.423 Professionals, more-
over, sometimes express concern about excesses and abuses, par-
ticularly in recent years with respect to the Super PAC ecosys-
tem.424 For principled professionals, norm-reinforcing rules and 
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enforcement mechanisms may be a welcome way to thwart un-
scrupulous competitors.425  
Professionals may be wary of more ambitious attempts to 
reshape industry norms, particularly if they see a threat to their 
bottom lines.426 Rules restricting commissions or limiting the 
type or number of clients that professionals serve might there-
fore face long odds. That said, if the industry faces intensifying 
public scrutiny and criticism, or if calls for public regulation 
mount, campaign professionals could come to see robust private 
reform as a desirable preemptive step. 
Separately, campaign funders could attempt to take matters 
into their own hands and use their clout to alter the campaign 
industry’s conduct. Large donors likely have the strongest incen-
tives and the most leverage to pursue change. Already, some of 
the biggest spenders have sought to contain agency costs and 
maximize the effectiveness of their funds. The Koch brothers’ po-
litical network, for instance, reportedly conducts “corporate-
style efficiency audits” of its groups’ activities.427 After assessing 
how its money was spent during the 2012 election, the network 
introduced new “spending and contracting controls” and “sought 
to reduce [its] reliance on . . . outside consultants.”428 Along sim-
ilar lines, during the 2016 presidential primaries, several of Sen-
ator Ted Cruz’s biggest financial backers attempted to use a 
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novel organizational structure to retain more control over spend-
ing decisions.429 
As more funders awaken to the potential for waste and 
abuse, monitoring and control arrangements will likely prolifer-
ate. To be clear, this development is not necessarily one to cheer. 
After all, minimizing agency costs may help big spenders exert 
even greater electoral influence. But perhaps similar techniques 
could be used to protect smaller donors. Although small donors 
may not individually have the capacity or leverage to change 
campaign industry practice, candidates and advocacy groups 
that rely on small donations—or seek to make themselves more 
attractive to small donors—might be in a position to act.  
Entrepreneurial reformers could help to pave the way. A re-
form group could, for instance, take on a role akin to Charity 
Navigator, an organization that helps charitable donors identify 
reputable nonprofits.430 In addition to gathering and disseminat-
ing existing information about how campaign entities operate, 
such a group could urge campaigners to become more transpar-
ent about their expenditures and professional relationships, or 
even push them to adopt a set of best practices regarding their 
service providers. The group could then encourage donors to give 
to the most transparent and accountable campaign entities and 
avoid the rest. Armed with more information, individual contrib-
utors could conceivably even instruct that their funds not be 
used for certain purposes or seek to condition their contributions 
on retaining a right to claw back money in cases of mismanage-
ment.431 
*** 
In sum, the existing practices and proclivities of the cam-
paign industry are not inevitable. A variety of public and private 
mechanisms exist to reform the industry’s conduct. None of these 
options will be a cure-all, but a sustained effort on multiple 
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fronts could usher in real changes to election campaigns and the 
democratic process.  
  CONCLUSION   
While election law scholars have aptly analogized political 
processes to economic markets,432 modern electoral politics is as 
much a literal market as a metaphorical one. Campaigns are not 
just occasions for democratic deliberation; they are also opportu-
nities for economic exchange. To advance their electoral inter-
ests, campaigners enlist profit-seeking professionals, paying 
them with funds that those very professionals often help to raise. 
These arrangements have complicated consequences. Campaign 
professionals can significantly aid their clients, but they can ex-
ploit them as well. They can facilitate politicking, but they can 
also degrade our politics. 
The campaign industry’s rise is a classic election law story 
and is one that has for too long been overlooked. It is a story of 
actors adapting to institutional change in unanticipated ways 
and producing effects that have reverberated across our inter-
connected political system. It is a story that continues to unfold 
as the campaign industry and our politics reconfigure one an-
other in an ongoing dialectic. Attending to the industry’s origins 
and its modern ascendancy deepens our understanding of the 
practical realities of electioneering and suggests new directions 
for scholarship, policymaking, and jurisprudence. It is a topic 
ripe for further study. 
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